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Introduction
Cartels and Leniency Programs
Cartels are a form of illegal behavior which involves the joint, coordinated eﬀort of several
rivaling agents to artiﬁcially restrict competition by using collusive practices such as
price ﬁxing, market sharing or entry prevention. Successful collusion allows these ﬁrms
to raise prices above the competitive level and reduces social welfare. Accordingly, most
antitrust laws prohibit cartels, and antitrust authorities devote large eﬀorts to ﬁghting
collusive practices.
In recent years, many policy reforms have been undertaken with the objective to
deter and break up cartel activities more eﬀectively and alleviate lengthy administrative
procedures. For example in 2008, the European Commission (EC) adopted a white
paper on the issue of using customer damages as a penalty1 and introduced a settlement
procedure for cartels to speed up investigations and to redirect resources towards a more
rigorous detection of cartels.2 On the other side of the Atlantic, in 1991, the United
States (US) Sentencing Commission promulgated guidelines governing the imposition of
sentences on organizations and allowed for signiﬁcantly harsher penalties.3 In 2004, the
Senate passed a tough antitrust reform act that increased the statutory limit on corporate
penalties from $10 million to $100 million and de-trebled civil damages for amnesty
applicants.4 One particular event shall however dwarf all previous and forthcoming
1White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008.
2Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004,
as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, Oﬃcial Journal L 171, 1.7.2008, p.3−5.
3U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sentencing Guidelines Manual and Appendices (2009).
4Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 1086, 108푡ℎ Cong., Title II,
§201-221 (2004).
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policy innovations worldwide: The revision of the Corporate Leniency Program, “the
greatest investigative tool ever designed to ﬁght cartels” (Hammond, 2004, p.2). 5
Leniency programs cancel the ﬁne against the ﬁrst cartel member that reports deci-
sive information to the antitrust authority and goes on collaborating with it during the
prosecution. In contrast to individual crimes where the wrongdoer is careful to be incog-
nito or unobserved, cartels are organized crimes that build on the coordination between
several agents who automatically acquire information on each other’s infringement that
they can potentially be induced to reveal. The leniency program - if well designed - can
not only disrupt existing cartels by making the confession of the crime attractive but
also prevent their formation by undermining trust among potential co-conspirators with
the increased likelihood that a cartel member, fearing detection, will turn the others in.
The antitrust division of the US Department of Justice (DoJ) introduced its ﬁrst
leniency policy in 1978. It substantially revised this scheme in 1993 to make it easier
and ﬁnancially more attractive for ﬁrms to apply. The revision involved three major
modiﬁcations: First, complete amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investi-
gation. Second, discretionary amnesty can be granted even if an investigation is already
underway. Third, all directors, oﬃcers and employees of the ﬁrst ﬁrm that cooperates
with the DoJ are protected from criminal prosecution.6 The revised leniency program
caused a surge in amnesty applications. While under the old regime, the DoJ obtained
one application per year, the revised program generated more than one application per
month.
Inspired by the success stories from overseas, the EC adopted its own leniency pro-
gram in 1996.7 This program failed for mainly the same reasons as its early US prede-
cessor. In 2002, the EC substantially revised its leniency program and adopted a policy
that closely mimics the DoJ’s Corporate Leniency Program of 1993.8 Under the 2002
Leniency Notice the number of leniency applications per year more than quadrupled.
Finally, in the latest revision of 2006, the EC adopted a marker system which grants
5U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Corporate Leniency Program (08/10/1993).
6U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Individual Leniency Program (08/10/1994).
71996 Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of ﬁnes in cartel cases, Oﬃcial Journal
C 207, 18.07.1996, p.4-6.
82002 Commission notice on immunity from ﬁnes and reduction of ﬁnes in cartel cases, Oﬃcial Journal
C 45, 19.02.2002, p.3-5.
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conditional immunity to the applicant on the basis of only limited information, leaving
enough time to gather the necessary evidence.9
The leniency programs in the US and the European Union (EU) display four main
diﬀerences: First, while in the US only the ﬁrst informant can get leniency, in the
EU, ﬁrms, that do not qualify for full immunity, can still be eligible for ﬁne discounts
of 30-50%, 20-30% and up to 20% respectively for the ﬁrst, second and subsequent
ﬁrms which provide the EC with evidence of signiﬁcant added value with respect to
what it already holds. Second, while ringleaders can be eligible for leniency in Europe,
they are excluded from the program in the US. Third, while the European antitrust
law does not hold individuals liable, the US leniency program can protect them from
criminal prosecution. Finally, and in my view, the most important diﬀerence is the US
treatment of parallel cartel oﬀenses by means of the Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
programs, included in the US Corporate Leniency Program in 1999, and the related
Omnibus Question. Amnesty Plus substantially reduces the ﬁne imposed on a ﬁrm,
already convicted in one cartel, if this ﬁrm is ﬁrst to report another cartel agreement
in which it is involved. In addition to beneﬁtting from a ﬁne discount in the initial
infringement, it gets complete immunity in the second oﬀense. Penalty Plus punishes
a ﬁrm which has failed to use Amnesty Plus and is later caught in a second oﬀense.
Moreover, companies’ representatives must answer whether they know of any collusion in
other markets as part of entering the leniency program. Failure to truthfully answer that
so-called Omnibus Question results in a complete loss of amnesty, which, coupled with
criminal ﬁnes for individual wrongdoers, creates incentives for the individual employee
to reveal ongoing collusion in other markets.
Implications for Antitrust Policies
The main objective of antitrust law enforcement against cartels is, ﬁrst, to avoid the
formation of cartels, that is deterrence, and second, to break up the cartels that have
not been deterred, that is desistance. A policy instrument is typically evaluated with
respect to its eﬀect on both deterrence and desistance.
92006 Commission notice on immunity from ﬁnes and reduction of ﬁnes in cartel cases, Oﬃcial Journal
C 298, 8.12.2006, p.17.
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A burgeoning theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the potential eﬀects of
leniency and its implications for antitrust policy. A common ﬁnding is that leniency may
destabilize cartels because conspirators may simultaneously deviate from the cartel and
apply for leniency (Harrington, 2008; Chen and Rey, 2007; Spagnolo, 2004). Leniency
may also destabilize cartels by increasing the riskiness of collusive equilibria (Spagnolo,
2004), by making it more likely that an investigation is successful and that the cartel
is put an end to (Motta and Polo, 2003) or when ﬁrms can exploit the policy to raise
rivals’ costs in subsequent periods (Ellis and Wilson, 2003). Alternatively, leniency
may stabilize collusive arrangements (Brisset and Thomas, 2004; Ellis and Wilson, 2003;
Spagnolo, 2000) and may encourage new cartels to form when probabilities of detection
and successful prosecution stochastically ﬂuctuate over time and ﬁrms anticipate reduced
ﬁnes (Harrington, 2008; Motta and Polo, 2003). The eﬀect of leniency may also depend
on market concentration (Ellis and Wilson, 2003), whether programs are courageous
or modest (Spagnolo, 2004; Aubert, Kovacic, and Rey, 2006) and whether ﬁnes are
proportional to accumulated cartel proﬁts (Motchenkova and Van der Laan, 2005).
Primarily due to the diﬃculty, common to all empirical research on collusion, that
active cartels are never observed in the data, empirical studies are scarce. Miller (2009)
provides the ﬁrst empirical evaluation of leniency, as it is applied in the US, and shows
that it enhances both deterrence and detection. Brenner (2009) examines the eﬀective-
ness of the 1996 version of the EU Leniency Program and ﬁnds that it helps information
revelation with regard to cartels already under scrutiny, but that it has no statistically
signiﬁcant deterrent eﬀects in the long-run.
Although experiments allow to elegantly capture the unobservable deterrence eﬀects
of leniency programs, Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) is the only experimental study
that keeps up with the models in the recent theoretical literature.10 The ﬁndings suggest
that the introduction of leniency causes more deterrence, a reduced life-time of cartels
that are not deterred and a constant high rate of collusive recidivism.
Although, in virtually all studies, the eﬀects of leniency hinge on speciﬁc parameters,
the overall conclusion of the literature is that leniency programs, if properly designed,
make collusion more diﬃcult.
10Apesteguia, Dufwenberg, and Selten (2003) are the ﬁrst to build an experiment, but they only
examine one-shot interactions. Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005) initially forces all subjects to collude
and can therefore not capture the eﬀect of leniency on deterrence.
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Global Cartels and Multimarket Contact
Nowadays, a large company is typically active in various industries. A single product
ﬁrm usually operates in several distinct geographic markets. Examining recent cartel
scores, a pattern in the time and place cartel activities occur becomes apparent. In many
cases, the biggest players in one particular market start colluding, and, after a short time
period during which the cartel has proven to be successful, replicate this activity in other
markets where they compete. Typical examples where the identities of the conspirators
as well as the durations of their participation in the infringements overlap include the
cartels in vitamins, lysine and citric acid, which I will discuss in chapters 1 and 2.
Another illustrative case is the cartel in mechanical carbon and graphite products. In
2003, the EC imposed ﬁnes totalling e101.44 million on SGL, Carbone Lorraine and ﬁve
other companies for operating a cartel in the market for carbon and graphite products.
Between October 1988 and December 1999, these companies, who together control 93% of
the European carbon and graphite products market, ﬁxed prices and warded oﬀ outside
competition by undercutting the few rivals left. During the same period, SGL was the
ringleader in two other cartels: The speciality graphites cartel where it ﬁxed prices and
exchanged commercially sensitive information with, among others, Carbone Lorraine,
Tokai Carbon and GraphTech (formerly UCAR) and the graphite electrode cartel where
it ﬁxed prices and shared markets with its partners from speciality graphites, Tokai
Carbon and UCAR, and six other companies. Despite SGL’s participation in all three
infringements, the EC decreased the ﬁne imposed on the company in carbon and graphite
products on the grounds that the cartels were contemporaneous and did not qualify for
recidivistic behavior. Moreover, SGL already had to pay high ﬁnes in the two other
cartels and found itself in a precarious ﬁnancial situation.
Implications for Antitrust Policies
The idea that multimarket contact may soften competition was ﬁrst raised by Corwin
Edwards when he wrote
“The interests of great enterprises are likely to touch at many points, and
it would be possible for each to mobilize at any of these points a consider-
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able aggregate of resources. The anticipated gain to such a concern from
unmitigated competitive attack upon another large enterprise at one point
of contact is likely to be slight as compared with the possible loss from re-
taliatory action by that enterprise at many other points of contact.”
(Edwards, 1955, p.335)
There exists a vast empirical literature supporting this hypothesis (for example Fernan-
dez and Marin (1998), Parker and Roeller (1997), Mason and Phillips (1996), Evans
and Kessides (1994), Kim and Singal (1993)), but relatively little has been done on the
topic in theory. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) provide a ﬁrst theoretical formaliza-
tion which shows that multimarket contact helps to sustain marginal collusion provided
that markets are not identical. This result becomes stronger when ﬁrms have strictly
concave static objective functions (Spagnolo, 1999) but gets weaker when they can only
imperfectly observe rivals’ actions (Thomas and Willig, 2006; Matsushima, 2001).
Although multimarket contact and its potential eﬀect on collusion are extremely
well documented, the question of whether and, if yes, how antitrust policies can take
this aspect into account remains unanswered. With the implementation of the Amnesty
Plus and Penalty Plus programs, the US DoJ has certainly taken a step in the right
direction, but theoretical as well as empirical evaluations of these programs are lacking.
My thesis aims at ﬁlling this gap in the theoretical literature.
The Layout of My Thesis
This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work
outlined above. The ﬁrst two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket
contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential eﬀects of Amnesty Plus and
Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into
perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority.
The main argument in that last chapter is that a speciﬁc instrument can only be as
eﬀective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust
authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modiﬁcation of a policy
instrument that helps deterrence.
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Chapter 1 examines the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives
of ﬁrms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these
policies in a leniency program undermine the eﬀectiveness of the latter by discouraging
the ﬁrms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives
of ﬁrms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and
Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a ﬁrst detection, a ﬁrm,
anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the ﬁrst place.
However, the eﬀect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty
Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels.
Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter
provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive
eﬀects of Amnesty Plus in a inﬁnitely repeated game framework when the ﬁrms use
their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that
prevents potential adverse eﬀects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this
rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without.
Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement eﬀort of an antitrust au-
thority and shows how this eﬀort changes with the introduction or modiﬁcation of spe-
ciﬁc policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the
marginal beneﬁt of conducting investigations. If this eﬀect is strong enough, a more
rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.
Chapter 1
Multimarket Contact Between
Leniency Applicants: Amnesty
Plus and Penalty Plus
“Good experience with citric acid. Next opportunity [vitamin] B2. We think
it’s worth that we explore all possibilities of cooperation. Let’s explore coop-
eration product-by-product.” (Kuno Sommer, Hoﬀmann-La Roche, quoted in
New York Times 10/10/99)
1.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the potential of leniency programs, allowing for Amnesty Plus and
Penalty Plus, to create incentives for companies, which are simultaneously participating
in multiple cartel activities, to reveal the entire range of their antitrust oﬀenses.
Recent cartel convictions in the markets for vitamins, citric acid and lysine suggest
that companies which have been colluding in one speciﬁc product or geographic mar-
ket are more likely to have engaged in, or at least to know about, cartel activities in
other adjacent markets. Consider for example the vitamin case where, during ten years,
Hoﬀmann-La Roche (HLR) was simultaneously active in virtually all cartels aﬀecting
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the whole extent of bulk vitamin production.1 The ﬁrst main group of cartels consisted
of price ﬁxing agreements in the markets for vitamin A and E between HLR, BASF and
Rhoˆne-Poulenc. The initial success of these arrangements inspired their replication in
the other vitamin markets. In these second-wave cartels, ﬁrms such as Merck, Takeda
and Daiichi, simultaneously colluding in at least one other vitamin, joined the pioneers.
While Rhoˆne-Poulenc’s disclosure of evidence on collusion in the vitamin A and E mar-
kets made the cartel’s wall of silence crumble, only BASF’s comprehensive collaboration
with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty Plus program accelerated
inquiries and ﬁnally led to the successful prosecution of all participants. Accordingly,
the European Commission (EC) stated that “the simultaneous existence of the collusive
arrangements in the various vitamins was not a spontaneous or haphazard development,
but was conceived and directed by the same persons at the most senior levels of the
companies concerned”.2 Surprisingly, when Rhoˆne-Poulenc plead guilty to its vitamin
conspiracies under the US Corporate Leniency Program and applied for leniency also in
Europe, it pursued cartel activities in methionine and methylglucamine.3
During the vitamin conspiracy, HLR was acting as a co-leader of the citric acid cartel,
the world’s most widespread acidulent and preservative used in the food and beverage
industry, at the side of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM). In 1997, at the time of HLR’s
conviction under the US antitrust law for its participation in the citric acid cartel,
the Division informed the company about the ongoing investigations in the vitamin
market and even solicited its cooperation in return for lenient treatment. Instead of
assisting the DoJ in its inquiries, not only did HLR’s top executives, engaged in the
citric acid conspiracy and holding at the same time important responsibilities in the
vitamin business, boldly deny any knowledge of, or participation in, a vitamin cartel,
but they also sharply increased their eﬀorts to conceal the illegal arrangements. In 1997,
shortly after ADM had plead guilty for criminal price ﬁxing in citric acid, HLR and
Jungbunzlauer AG (JBL) agreed to plea-bargain and to pay ﬁnes totaling $25 million.
At the same time, ADM and JBL ﬁxed prices and shared markets in sodium gluconate.4
1Concerned were the markets for vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B3 (niacin), B4 (choline chloride), B5, B6,
B9 (folic acid), B12, C, D3, H (biotin), beta carotene, carotenoids and premixes.
2EC IP/01/1625 November 2001.
3EC IP/01/1625 November 2001, EC IP/02/976 July 2002, EC IP/02/1746 November 2002.
4EC IP/01/1743 December 2001, IP/01/1355 October 2001.
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In 1995, two years before the citric acid cartel was exposed, dawn raids in the head-
quarters of ADM, the largest US processor of agricultural commodities, produced hard
evidence of collusive arrangements in lysine, an essential amino acid. This investigation
directly led to the citric acid cartel when authorities found documents and video tapes
which contained references to the conspiracy in citric acid. The illegal price ﬁxing and
market sharing agreements in lysine were initiated by ADM in 1992 and discovered by the
public in 1995 (Connor, 2000).5 Besides ADM were involved its Asian rivals Ajinomoto,
Cheil, Kyowa and Sewon. In 1996, the Asian lysine producers plead guilty and agreed
to cooperate with the DoJ and to testify against ADM in return for lenient treatment.
Just after the adoption of the 1996 EC Leniency Notice, Ajinomoto decided to inform
the EC on the cartel and qualiﬁed for a 50% discount in ﬁnes. At the time Ajinomoto
came forward, it was involved in a conspiracy in the market for nucleotides lasting until
mid 1996 when it was unveiled by its accomplice Takeda, itself under investigation for
participation in the vitamin cartel case.6
In the US, convictions of global cartels in the 1990s suggest that at least a dozen
ﬁrms have become repeated oﬀenders in related product industries (Connor, 2003). The
DoJ has been investigating around 50 alleged international cartels in 2004, and half of
them have been detected during inquiries on separate markets (Hammond, 2004). These
so-called ‘rolling investigations’ and ‘cartel proﬁling’ techniques are the DoJ’s response
to companies’ recidivism. With the objective of fully exploiting the multimarket contact
between colluding ﬁrms, the DoJ implemented the Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
programs in 1999 as part of its Corporate Leniency Policy (Spratling, 1999). According
to Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement
for encouraging companies who are already under investigation to report the full extent
of their antitrust crimes [. . .].” (Hammond, 2004, p.16).
Leniency programs cancel the ﬁne against the ﬁrst cartel member that brings de-
cisive evidence to the antitrust authority. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are aimed
at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging subjects of ongoing investigations to
consider whether they qualify for amnesty in other than currently inspected markets.
5EC IP/00/589 June 2000.
6EC IP/02/1907 December 2002.
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Amnesty Plus oﬀers a ﬁrm which plea-bargains an agreement for participation in one
cartel, where it cannot obtain guaranteed amnesty, complete immunity in a second car-
tel aﬀecting another market. Provided that the ﬁrm agrees to fully cooperate in the
investigation of the conspiracy of which the DoJ was previously not aware, it is auto-
matically granted amnesty for this second oﬀense. Moreover, the company beneﬁts from
a substantial additional discount, i.e. the Plus, in the calculation of its ﬁne in any plea
agreement for the initial matter under investigation.7 The counterpart of Amnesty Plus
is Penalty Plus, or equivalently “If Amnesty Plus is the carrot, Penalty Plus is the stick.”
(Jarrett Arp and Spratling, 2003, p.29). If companies that neglect to take advantage of
Amnesty Plus are nevertheless caught for a second time, their behavior is more severely
ﬁned than it would otherwise merit. The company’s knowing failure to report aggravates
the punishment, not only increasing the size of the ﬁne but also the length of the jail
sentence for its executives.8
Under the current EU policy, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus do not exist. Although
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended
the inclusion of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the EU Leniency Program,
the EC did not seize the opportunity to follow the US example by introducing a similar
policy.
This chapter examines the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incen-
tives of ﬁrms to report a cartel under a leniency program. Amnesty Plus and Penalty
Plus encourage the ﬁrms to report a second cartel after a ﬁrst cartel detection. These
reporting incentives increase with the size of the ﬁne discount granted under Amnesty
Plus. Ex ante, however, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous eﬀect on
the eﬀectiveness of leniency programs. On the one hand, the ﬁrms may be less willing
to report a cartel if they anticipate that this move entails the break down of the other
7The size of the additional discount mainly depends on three factors: The strength of the evidence
provided by the cooperating company, the potential signiﬁcance of the revealed case measured in terms
of volume of commerce involved, geographic scope and the number of co-conspirators, and the likelihood
that the DoJ would have detected the cartel absent self-reporting (Hammond, 2006).
8The DoJ does not state an exact percentage for the ﬁne increase but asserts to pursue a ﬁne or
jail sentence at the upper end of the Guidelines Range (Hammond, 2006). An example of Penalty Plus
is the DoJ’s ﬁning decision in monochloracetic acid in 2003. The German company Hoechst AG was
ﬁned roughly 130% above the minimum guideline ﬁne due to its failure to report the illegal agreement in
monochloracetic acid at the time it was convicted for its participation in the sorbates cartel (Hammond,
2004).
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cartel. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may thus help to sustain a cartel which would
have been reported under the EU Leniency Program. On the other hand, the ﬁrms may
also prefer to immediately report both cartels. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may
thus lead to the reporting of a cartel that would not have been reported under the EU
Leniency Program. This desirable eﬀect occurs if the probability of detection exceeds
a certain threshold above which the ﬁrms ﬁnd it too costly to sustain a cartel that has
a high probability of being detected just to preserve the other, proﬁtable, cartel. This
threshold increases with the ﬁne discount granted under Amnesty Plus. Hence, while
Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may be good for competition ex post, they may come
with an undesirable eﬀect ex ante, especially if the ﬁne discount is large.
The study of the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on ﬁrms’ incentives to
self-report has been left exclusively to legal scholars. Jephcott (2002) is ﬁrst to high-
light the lack of an equivalent to the Amnesty Plus policy in the 2002 EC Leniency
Notice. McElwee (2004) argues that Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus intensify the ‘race
to the courtroom’ dynamics and thus generate distrust among cartel members.9 More-
over, companies volunteering information on their participation in other cartels during
an investigation on a distinct product or geographic market appear to be rare. This
seems especially true for antitrust regimes under which the altruism of companies is not
substantially rewarded. Even though exceptions may occasionally occur,10 the author
recommends the introduction of a leniency policy similar to Amnesty Plus and Penalty
Plus in Europe. In a recent study, Wils (2007) expresses scepticism and argues that
Amnesty Plus, by granting a supplementary reduction in ﬁnes, oﬀers more than 100%
leniency to a cooperating company. He argues that this is debatable in itself and that
there should be less need for a positive ﬁnancial reward, as the probability of detection
after a ﬁrst conviction is higher than normal.
Although the legal literature on the subject is burgeoning, to my knowledge, there is
9Under the US Leniency Program, only the ﬁrst reporting ﬁrm is eligible to full immunity from
ﬁnes. The so-called ‘winner-takes-it-all’ approach sets up a race among ﬁrms competing for being ﬁrst
to denounce the cartel to the antitrust authority.
10In the Belgian Beer Brewers’ cartel, Interbrew, one of the colluding companies under investigation,
spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though
it could not beneﬁt from an additional ﬁne discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly
extensive cooperation, as it would have under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC
IP/01/1740 December 2001).
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no economic analysis which tries to clarify possible motifs for the EC’s non-adoption of
Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, let alone to model the role of leniency programs when
companies commit multiple antitrust oﬀenses. I take the ﬁrst step towards ﬁlling this
gap in economic theory on leniency programs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 brieﬂy reviews
economic literature related to the topic. Section 1.3 sets up the model. Section 1.4
analyzes the second stage of the revelation game. I then examine the ﬁrst stage of the
game in section 1.5. In Section 1.6 I examine rollover investigations. Section 1.7 brieﬂy
concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter examines how the design of leniency programs aﬀects cartel stability and
therefore relates to the current economic literature on leniency policies. Recent theoreti-
cal contributions such as Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007), Aubert, Kovacic, and
Rey (2006), Spagnolo (2004) and Motta and Polo (2003) study the trade-oﬀ a leniency
program generates between less cartel stability through encouraged reporting and more
cartel stability through reduced expected ﬁnes. It also elaborates on the diﬀerences in
conception of leniency programs and their impact on the eﬃcacy of antitrust enforce-
ment. The overall conclusion of this literature is that leniency programs, if properly
designed, make collusion more diﬃcult.
While in previous work collusion can occur in one market only, I consider ﬁrms which
simultaneously participate in several collusive agreements. Chen and Rey (2007) and
Spagnolo (2004) are the only studies on leniency programs which touch upon recidivism.
In Spagnolo (2004), higher sanctions for recurrent antitrust oﬀenders rationalize the use
of reduced ﬁne schemes when ﬁrms follow an optimal two-phase punishment. Reporting
raises ﬁnes and reduces expected proﬁts from further collusion, limiting the costs the
ﬁrms are willing to incur to punish the whistle-blower defecting from the cartel in the
ﬁrst place. Chen and Rey (2007) show that ruling out leniency for repeated oﬀenders
renders the leniency program completely ineﬀective in deterring collusion. Prohibiting
leniency for recidivistic ﬁrms stabilize subsequent collusion by ensuring that after having
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reported once, no cartel member has an incentive to report again in the future. While
my analysis captures the idea of recidivism by the ﬁrms’ opportunity, following a suc-
cessful investigation in one market, to continue price ﬁxing in another market, neither
of the above studies considers ﬁrms which are simultaneously involved in multiple cartel
activities.
Motchenkova and Van der Laan (2005) explicitly acknowledge the importance of
ﬁrms’ multimarket operations within a leniency framework. They use the multimarket
context to examine the eﬀectiveness of leniency rules, given that ﬁrms, admitting their
collusive conduct, incur costs other than ﬁnes. These additional costs are modeled as the
loss in sales in markets, other than the one involved in illegal behavior, due to negative
reputation eﬀects following a cartel conviction. Although the ﬁrms operate in several
markets, they form a cartel in one market only.
Another noteworthy diﬀerence from the above literature is that, in my model, cartels
do not take the form of ongoing criminal relationships. This is in line with Feess and
Walzl (2004) who develop a static model to compare leniency policies in the US and the
EU and Spagnolo (2000) who examines anticompetitive eﬀects of leniency programs in
one-shot market interactions.11
Finally, most of the leniency literature focuses on the potential of leniency programs
to deter collusion ex ante. I however suppose that cartels have already been formed and
instead concentrate on the issue of ex post desistance.12
My analysis also relates to the literature on multimarket contact. In their seminal
paper, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) build on the idea, ﬁrst raised by Edwards (1955)
and further developed in a ﬁnite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that
multimarket contact across ﬁrms may foster anticompetitive outcomes. The authors
show that strategically linking markets weakly increases cartel proﬁts because it slack-
ens the incentive constraints that limit ﬁrms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in
settings of repeated interactions. Their technical result coincides with the intuition that
multimarket contact allows for linkage-induced punishment which can deter deviations
from collusive behavior.
11Feess and Walzl (2004) focus on diﬀerences with respect to e.g. the relevance of the amount of
evidence provided in the determination of the ﬁne reductions and the number of ﬁrms eligible to leniency.
They do not address the issue of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus.
12See Chen and Rey (2007) for a discussion of deterrence versus desistance as the focus of antitrust
policy.
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Apart from the main idea of the above studies, namely that multimarket contact
between ﬁrms may inﬂuence collusive outcomes, the setup of my model is diﬀerent in
that I abstract from repeated interactions between colluding ﬁrms and do not examine
the cartel formation stage of the game. Moreover, multimarket contact alone does not
aﬀect collusive behavior. It is Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus which create the link
between the ﬁrms’ reporting decisions in the markets where they collude.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Basic Assumptions
I analyze the interaction between two symmetric ﬁrms, F1 and F2, which simultane-
ously collude in two distinct product markets, 퐴 and 퐵, in the presence of an antitrust
authority (AA). I compare the ﬁrms’ decisions to report a cartel under the EU and US
Leniency Programs whose sole diﬀerence here is that the latter allows for Amnesty Plus
and Penalty Plus. Amnesty Plus oﬀers a ﬁrm which has been caught colluding in one
market, either through reporting of its co-conspirator or through the investigation eﬀorts
of the AA, a reduction in the ﬁne imposed in this market in return for reporting the
remaining cartel in the other market. Penalty Plus increases the ﬁne for a recidivistic
ﬁrm.
Throughout the analysis, I use the following notation: I refer to variables of a speciﬁc
market by using the indices 퐴 and 퐵. When considering any of the two markets I use
푘 ∈ {퐴,퐵}. For general considerations of the two markets in comparison to each other
I introduce the indices 푖 and 푗 where 푖, 푗 ∈ {퐴,퐵} and 푖 ∕= 푗.
When colluding, each ﬁrm earns the collusive proﬁt Π푘 > 0. The collusive proﬁts
are market-speciﬁc because markets 퐴 and 퐵 may diﬀer in size and proﬁtability. When
competing, each ﬁrm gets 0.
The strictness of the antitrust enforcement policy is summarized by an exogenous
market-speciﬁc investigation probability 푞푘 ∈ [0, 1] with which the AA opens an inquiry
leading to the conviction of the colluding ﬁrms with certainty in market 푘.13 I assume
13To keep the model simple, I identify investigation and conviction with a single probability. However,
I could introduce uncertainty with respect to the AA’s ability to prove guilty a detected cartel by
substituting 푞푠 for 푞 where 푠 is the probability with which the investigation succeeds. See Chen and Rey
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that the detection probabilities are independent across markets. At the time the ﬁrms
decide to enter an illegal agreement, they cannot directly observe the prevailing inves-
tigation probabilities, but they conjecture the strictness of the AA’s enforcement policy
based on a market-speciﬁc combination of observable variables which determine the cur-
rent antitrust policy. Their ex ante conjecture of a market speciﬁc detection probability
푞¯푘 is the expected value of the ex post realization. As I focus on desistance, I suppose
that, before the start of the game, the conjectured detection probabilities are such that
the ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to form a cartel in each of the markets. However, the conjec-
tured probabilities of being convicted may change over time. Potential reasons could be
complaints from consumers, employees revealing information to the AA, a shift in the
AA’s budget constraint which aﬀects available resources and eﬀorts devoted to antitrust
enforcement in the diﬀerent product markets or simply changes in the way the AA oper-
ates. The change in detection probabilities acts as an exogenous shock on the expected
proﬁtability of a cartel and may prompt the ﬁrms to reconsider their decision to collude.
Following an increase in detection probabilities, the ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether
to self-report (푆) or not (푁푆). This decision is a function of conviction probabilities,
cartel proﬁts and ﬁnes.
1.3.2 Enforcement Choices
The AA commits to its enforcement policy by setting
- the market-speciﬁc full ﬁne 퐹푘, imposed on a non-reporting ﬁrm in case of a con-
viction. The size of the ﬁne is exogenously given by law.14
- the reduced ﬁne for the self-reporting ﬁrm equal to 0. Only the ﬁrst self-reporting
ﬁrm is eligible to amnesty. The latecomer pays the full ﬁne. When both ﬁrms
report simultaneously, each is ﬁrst with probability 0.5.
- the ﬁne discount 푅푘 ∈ ]0, 퐹푘] under Amnesty Plus. When both ﬁrms simultane-
ously apply for Amnesty Plus, each is ﬁrst with probability 0.5.
(2007) for an analysis of optimal leniency rates before any and once an investigation is opened which
distinguishes the probability of launching the investigation from the probability with which it succeeds.
14Note that 퐹푘 may be above as well as below Π푘. I only assume that the combination of 푞¯푘 and 퐹푘
is such that the ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to collude in each of the markets.
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- the increased ﬁne 훼퐹푘 where 훼 > 1 and (훼− 1)퐹푘 reﬂects the additional charge a
ﬁrm has to pay when convicted in one market after a prior detection in another
market.
1.3.3 Timing
The model is static. There is one period that consists of two stages. Before the start of
the game, the AA commits to its ﬁning policy. If no cartel is reported, with probability
0.5 the AA ﬁrst investigates and discovers 퐴 with probability 푞퐴 before starting an
inquiry in 퐵 with probability 푞퐵. With probability 0.5 the AA investigates ﬁrst 퐵 and
then 퐴. Nature then chooses the order in which a possible investigation takes place, and
the ﬁrms observe this. When forming a cartel, the ﬁrms conjecture a market-speciﬁc
conviction probability 푞¯푘. I assume that the conjectures are identical for both ﬁrms and
suﬃciently low so as to make the ﬁrms collude in both markets. Both ﬁrms receive
market-speciﬁc signals which make them revise their conjectured detection probabilities
from 푞¯푘 to 푞푘. The shift in detection probabilities may push the ﬁrms to consider whether
they wish to spontaneously report one or both cartels to the AA. If 푞푘 ≤ 푞¯푘, collusion
is still proﬁtable, and the ﬁrms have no incentives to desist from cartel activities and to
reveal information to the AA. Thus, the only cases relevant to my analysis result from
an increase in probabilities such that 푞푘 > 푞¯푘 in at least one of the markets. Figure 1.1
shows the time structure of the game.
Stage 1: Reporting Decision in Both Markets. The ﬁrms simultaneously
decide whether to report one, both or none of the cartels.
- If both cartels are reported, the AA convicts each cartel with certainty. The game
does not reach stage 2.
- If only one cartel is reported, the AA convicts this cartel with certainty, and the
game moves on to stage 2.
- If the ﬁrms do not reveal any information, the AA detects cartel 푖 with probability
푞푖. The ﬁrms may then want to reconsider their decision on whether to report
cartel 푗. Hence, if the AA convicts cartel 푖, the game moves on to stage 2. With
probability 1 − 푞푖, the cartel 푖 remains undetected, and the game does not reach
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stage 2. In this case, the AA investigates and detects the cartel 푗 with probability
푞푗 .
Stage 2: Reporting Decision After One Detection. The game reaches stage 2
if only cartel 푖 was detected in stage 1, and the cartel 푗 survived that stage. The ﬁrms
simultaneously decide whether to report the remaining cartel 푗.
- If the ﬁrms do not report the remaining cartel 푗, the AA convicts this cartel with
probability 푞푗 .
- If at least one of the ﬁrms reports the remaining cartel 푗, the AA convicts this
cartel with certainty.
- timet=1
Nature chooses order,
AA commits to
ﬁning policy
?
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on probabilities
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Figure 1.1: Time Line
1.4 Reporting Decision in Stage 2
The game reaches stage 2 only after one cartel conviction in stage 1 and thus, there
are two diﬀerent scenarios which lead to this stage. First, no ﬁrm reports, but the
AA investigates and detects the cartel in market 푖 which happens with probability 푞푖.
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Second, both ﬁrms report the cartel in 푖 but keep secret the cartel in 푗. I ﬁrst examine the
pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the game in stage 2 under a European policy without
Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. I then add Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus and show
how these programs aﬀect the parameter range in which these equilibria occur.
1.4.1 EU Leniency Program without Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
Figure 1.2 presents the normal form of the revelation game played in stage 2 in the
absence of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. F1’s possible actions are reported vertically,
those of F2 horizontally. A ﬁrm that reports the cartel in stage 2, while its partner
adheres to cooperation, makes zero proﬁts and pays no ﬁne as it is the only ﬁrm that
applies for leniency. If both ﬁrms report, each of them receives immunity from ﬁnes
with equal chance. If no ﬁrm self-reports, cartel 푗 is detected with probability 푞푗 in
which case, each ﬁrm has to pay the ﬁne 퐹푗 . Note that the normal form of this game
is identical no matter which one of the scenarios leads to stage 2. The reason for this
is that each ﬁrm, even if it has already used leniency and reported one of the cartels
in stage 1, is eligible for leniency in stage 2. The ﬁrms thus have equal chances to get
leniency in stage 2.
F1, F2 S NS
S −12퐹푗 ,−
1
2퐹푗 0,−퐹푗
NS −퐹푗 ,0 (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗 ,(1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗
Figure 1.2: Stage 2 Payoﬀ Matrix EU
The outcome in which both ﬁrms report the remaining cartel 푗, i.e. (푆푗 , 푆푗), is always
an equilibrium of this game. There however exists a conviction probability threshold
Π푗
Π푗+퐹푗
≡ 푞˜푗 below which this game exhibits a second equilibrium in which the ﬁrms do
not report cartel 푗, i.e. (푁푆푗 , 푁푆푗). If the game has two equilibria, I assume that the
ﬁrms coordinate on the Pareto dominating outcome and therefore do not self-report.15
For a conviction probability above the threshold 푞˜푗 , the ﬁrms have a dominant strategy
in reporting the remaining cartel, and thus, (푆푗 , 푆푗) is the only equilibrium.
15That the ﬁrms succeed in coordinating on the most collusive equilibrium is a standard assumption
in the literature on leniency programs (see e.g. Motta and Polo (2003)).
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Both ﬁrms reporting the remaining cartel constitutes an equilibrium only if, for
given ﬁnes and cartel proﬁts, the probability of being convicted in stage 2 exceeds the
probability threshold which makes a unilateral deviation from cooperation just unprof-
itable. Thus, the critical investigation probability is such that the expected proﬁts from
the remaining cartel are zero. Figure 1.3 depicts this situation under the EU Leniency
Program.
-
EU
푞˜푗
푁푆 푆
푞푗
Figure 1.3: Stage 2 Reporting Decisions EU
An increase in the ﬁne a non-reporting ﬁrm would have to pay in the case of a
conviction in stage 2 decreases the detection probability needed to induce self-reporting.
On the contrary, higher cartel proﬁts in stage 2 raise the critical probability thresholds.
1.4.2 US Leniency Program with Amnesty Plus
In the presence of Amnesty Plus, the game played in stage 2 depends on the scenario
that leads to this stage. First, if there is no reporting in stage 1 but the AA discovers
cartel 푖 by its mere eﬀorts, both ﬁrms can get a discount in their ﬁne initially imposed.
Hence, in stage 2, both ﬁrms are eligible to Amnesty Plus. Figure 1.4 shows the payoﬀ
matrix that corresponds to this situation.
F1, F2 S NS
S 12(푅푖 − 퐹푗),
1
2(푅푖 − 퐹푗) 푅푖,−퐹푗
NS −퐹푗 ,푅푖 (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗 ,(1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗
Figure 1.4: Stage 2 Payoﬀ Matrix US, No Reporting in Stage 1, AP
The only diﬀerence between the companies’ expected payoﬀs under the EU and the
US policy is that, in the presence of Amnesty Plus, a ﬁrm which reports the remaining
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cartel in stage 2 can get a reduction 푅푖 in the ﬁne previously imposed.
Second, if it is the reporting of only cartel 푖 in stage 1 that leads to stage 2, Amnesty
Plus creates an asymmetry between the ﬁrms in stage 2. Only the ﬁrm that has not
received leniency in stage 1 is eligible for Amnesty Plus in stage 2. The ﬁrm that has
already received leniency and therefore has paid zero ﬁnes in stage 1 can get leniency in
stage 2, but it cannot get Amnesty Plus. The reporting incentives of this ﬁrm are thus
the same as under the EU policy. Figure 1.5 presents the payoﬀ matrix in stage 2 after
F2 has received leniency in stage 1.
F1, F2 S NS
S 12(푅푖 − 퐹푗),−
1
2퐹푗 푅푖,−퐹푗
NS −퐹푗 ,0 (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗 ,(1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗
Figure 1.5: Stage 2 Payoﬀ Matrix US, Reporting in Stage 1, AP
Note that F2 has lower incentives to report in stage 2 than F1 which is eligible for
Amnesty Plus. As the non reporting equilibrium can exist only if no ﬁrm has an incentive
to report, it is the deviation possibility of F1 which is relevant.
As after each scenario in stage 1, there is at least one ﬁrm eligible for Amnesty
Plus in stage 2, the conviction probability threshold below which this game exhibits two
possible equilibria is now
Π푗−푅푖
Π푗+퐹푗
≡ 푞˜푎푝푗 (푅푖). Hence, if the conviction probability is low
enough, the ﬁrms coordinate on the Pareto dominating equilibrium which is both ﬁrms
not reporting the remaining cartel, i.e. (푁푆푗 , 푁푆푗). For a conviction probability above
this threshold, the ﬁrms again have a dominant strategy in reporting the cartel and
hence, (푆푗 , 푆푗) is the only equilibrium.
Comparing the probability thresholds in the EU and the US, it is straightforward
that 푞˜푎푝푗 (푅푖) < 푞˜푗 . The reason for this diﬀerence is that Amnesty Plus links the two
markets. The outcome in market 퐴 aﬀects the reporting decisions in market 퐵. A ﬁrm,
once convicted in market 퐴, has stronger incentives to denounce the cartel in market 퐵
because it can get a reduction in the ﬁne imposed in 퐴. Thus, the collusive equilibrium
is easier to break than under the EU policy where the actions taken in one of the markets
do not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ decisions in the other market. Figure 1.6 shows the probability
thresholds in the US.
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푁푆 푆
푞푗
US(AP)
푞˜푎푝푗 (푅푖)
푆∗
Figure 1.6: Stage 2 Reporting Decisions US, AP
The ﬁne discount under Amnesty Plus decreases the probability threshold and thus,
the probability range for which the outcome (푆푗 , 푆푗) is the unique equilibrium is larger
in the US than in the EU. In the region 푆∗, the equilibrium of the stage game switches.
The EU Leniency Program would have sustained the collusive equilibrium whereas in
the US, Amnesty Plus oﬀers a proﬁtable deviation to a ﬁrm which has been ﬁned in stage
1. Therefore, conditional on conviction in stage 1, Amnesty Plus enhances reporting in
stage 2. Note that the probability threshold decreases with the size of the ﬁne discount
under Amnesty Plus.
1.4.3 US Leniency Program with Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
Penalty Plus severely punishes companies which are caught colluding in stage 2 after a
cartel conviction in stage 1 by increasing the ﬁne to 훼퐹푗 . As a consequence, expected
cartel proﬁts in stage 2 decrease and thus, Penalty Plus reinforces the beneﬁcial eﬀect of
Amnesty Plus in this stage. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show the expected payoﬀs under the US
Leniency Program with Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, ﬁrst after a detection without
reporting, and second, after a detection through reporting in stage 1.
F1, F2 S NS
S 12(푅푖 − 훼퐹푗),
1
2(푅푖 − 훼퐹푗) 푅푖,−훼퐹푗
NS −훼퐹푗 ,푅푖 (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗훼퐹푗 ,(1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗훼퐹푗
Figure 1.7: Stage 2 Payoﬀ Matrix US, No Reporting in Stage 1, AP and PP
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F1, F2 S NS
S 12(푅푖 − 훼퐹푗),−
1
2훼퐹푗 푅푖,−훼퐹푗
NS −훼퐹푗 ,0 (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗훼퐹푗 ,(1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗훼퐹푗
Figure 1.8: Stage 2 Payoﬀ Matrix US, Reporting in Stage 1, AP and PP
The fear of harsher ﬁnes further lowers the probability threshold to
Π푗−푅푖
Π푗+훼퐹푗
≡
푞˜푝푝푗 (푅푖, 훼) above which the (푆푗 , 푆푗) outcome is the unique equilibrium. Figure 1.9 shows
the thresholds after the inclusion of Penalty Plus and compares the situation to the EU
and the US with Amnesty Plus only.
-
EU
푁푆 푆
푞푗
US(AP&PP) US(AP)
푞˜푝푝푗 (푅푖, 훼)
푆∗푆∗∗
Figure 1.9: Stage 2 Reporting Decisions US, AP and PP
Penalty Plus enlarges the probability range for which the ﬁrms report the second
infringement in stage 2 by 푆∗∗ at the expense of the zone where (푁푆푗 , 푁푆푗) is the Pareto
dominating equilibrium. The probability threshold decreases with the ﬁne increase under
Penalty Plus.
1.5 Reporting Decision in Stage 1
When the ﬁrms decide whether to report a cartel in stage 1, they anticipate the equilib-
rium outcome in stage 2. First, I compare the ﬁrms reporting decisions in stage 1 under
the EU and US Leniency Programs in the presence of Amnesty Plus. Second, I show
how Penalty Plus aﬀects the outcome of this stage.
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1.5.1 Amnesty Plus
For 푞푗 ∈ ]푞˜
푎푝
푗 (푅푖), 푞˜푗 ] Amnesty Plus switches the equilibrium in stage 2 from (푁푆푗 , 푁푆푗)
to (푆푗 , 푆푗). While Amnesty Plus produces the desirable outcome in stage 2 for the
detection probabilities in this range, it may have an adverse eﬀect on the reporting
incentives in stage 1.
Consider the case where 푞푖 > 푞˜푖 and 푞푗 ∈ ]푞˜
푎푝
푗 (푅푖), 푞˜푗 ]. Under the EU Leniency
Program, the ﬁrms report cartel 푖 but not cartel 푗. Nothing links the two markets and
reporting cartel 푖 does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ reporting incentives in market 푗. Under the
US Leniency Program, however, the reporting of only cartel 푖 in stage 1 would trigger
the reporting of cartel 푗 in stage 2. The ﬁrms now have two possibilities: Either they
report none of the cartels in stage 1 and report the remaining cartel in stage 2 only if
the AA detects a cartel in stage 1. Or they immediately report both cartels in stage 1.
Note that reporting both cartels gives a payoﬀ of zero whereas by reporting cartel 푗 but
not cartel 푖 the reporting ﬁrm would earn −12퐹푖 and by reporting 푖 but not 푗 it would
get −퐹푖. If the ﬁrms do not report any of the cartels in stage 1, and the AA investigates
ﬁrst market 푖 and only then 푗, two states can occur: First, with probability 푞푖, the AA
discovers cartel 푖 and both ﬁrms rush to report cartel 푗 in stage 2 in the hope to beneﬁt
from Amnesty Plus. Second, with probability 1 − 푞푖, the AA does not detect cartel 푖,
stage 2 is not reached, and it detects cartel 푗 with 푞푗 . Hence, the ﬁrms immediately
report both cartels in stage 1 if
푞푖
(
−퐹푖 +
1
2
(푅푖 − 퐹푗)
)
+ (1− 푞푖) (Π푖 + (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗퐹푗) < 0 (1.1)
The left hand side (LHS) of the inequality in (1.1) is continuous and decreasing in 푞푖.
As this condition is violated for 푞푖 = 0 but is satisﬁed for 푞푖 = 1, there must exist a
probability threshold 푞¯푎푝푖 (푅푖) ∈ ]0, 1] such that it holds for 푞푖 ≥ 푞¯
푎푝
푖 (푅푖). This signiﬁes
that, if the probability of detection in market 푖 is high enough, the ﬁrms ﬁnd it too costly
to sustain the unproﬁtable cartel 푖 just to preserve the proﬁtable cartel 푗 and therefore
report both cartels in stage 1. Note that the threshold 푞¯푎푝푖 (푅푖) increases with 푅푖. The
higher the ﬁne reduction 푅푖, the higher is the detection probability 푞푖 needed to reach
this desirable outcome. 푅푖 generates a trade-oﬀ between cartel desistance ex post and
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cartel desistance ex ante. A high 푅푖 induces the reporting of cartel 푗 after the detection
of cartel 푖 for low values of 푞푗 . Hence, after a ﬁrst detection, the AA would want to set
the ﬁne discount at the highest possible level. Ex ante, however, high values of 푅푖 can
give the wrong reporting incentives to the ﬁrms. Hence, a generous ﬁne discount must
be coupled with a high detection probability 푞푖.
1.5.2 Penalty Plus
Penalty Plus enlarges the potentially problematic probability range from ]푞˜푎푝푗 (푅푖), 푞˜푗 ] to
]푞˜푝푝푗 (푅푖, 훼), 푞˜푗 ] where 푞˜
푝푝
푗 (푅푖, 훼) < 푞˜
푎푝
푗 (푅푖). Penalty Plus also has a direct impact on the
ﬁrms’ reporting incentives in stage 1 by increasing the expected ﬁnes when the ﬁrms
decide not to use Amnesty Plus.16 The ﬁrms immediately report both cartels in stage 1
if
푞푖
(
−퐹푖 +
1
2
(푅푖 − 훼퐹푗)
)
+ (1− 푞푖) (Π푖 + (1− 푞푗)Π푗 − 푞푗훼퐹푗) < 0 (1.2)
The inequality in (1.2) is satisﬁed for 푞푖 ≥ 푞¯
푝푝
푖 (푅푖, 훼) ∈ ]0, 1] where 푞¯
푝푝
푖 (푅푖, 훼) increases
with 푅푖, decreases with 훼 and 푞¯
푝푝
푖 (푅푖, 1) = 푞¯
푎푝
푖 (푅푖). Hence, for a given 푅푖, Penalty Plus
increases the incentives of ﬁrms to report the remaining cartel in stage 2 as well as to
report both cartels in stage 1. If however the no reporting outcome occurs in stage 1, it
occurs for a higher probability range compared to the policy with only Amnesty Plus.
1.6 Rollover Investigations
Rollover investigations, as they occur under the US policy, imply that the probability
of detection in market 푗 increases after the detection of cartel 푖. The eﬀect of such
investigations depends on whether they make the detection probability in stage 2 switch
the range. There is no eﬀect if the detection probability increases only slightly such that
the stage 2 equilibrium outcome remains the same or if the initial equilibrium outcome
in this stage is (푆푗 , 푆푗). If the initial equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is (푁푆푗 , 푁푆푗), and
the rollover investigations cause a suﬃciently big jump in the detection probability, then
16Note that Penalty Plus also increases the ﬁne imposed on a ﬁrm that is not eligible for Amnesty
Plus in stage 2 because it already reported in stage 1.
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the equilibrium may switch from (푁푆푗 , 푁푆푗) to (푆푗 , 푆푗) for 푞푗 ≤ 푞˜
푎푝
푗 (푅푖). In this case,
Amnesty Plus is even more eﬀective in encouraging the ﬁrms to report the remaining
cartel in stage 2. Hence, in terms of ex post desistance, rollover investigations are clearly
beneﬁcial for competition. Ex ante, however, if Amnesty Plus gives the wrong incentives
in the ﬁrst stage, it would do so for a larger range of detection probabilities.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of
ﬁrms to report a cartel under a leniency program.
I ﬁnd that Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the ﬁrms to report a second
cartel after a ﬁrst cartel detection. The reporting incentives increase with the size of
the ﬁne discount granted under Amnesty Plus. Ex ante, however, Amnesty Plus and
Penalty Plus have an ambiguous eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness of leniency programs. On
the one hand, the ﬁrms may be less willing to report a cartel if they anticipate that this
move entails the break down of the other cartel. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may
thus help to sustain a cartel which would have been reported under the EU Leniency
Program. On the other hand, the ﬁrms may also prefer to immediately report both
cartels. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may thus lead to the reporting of a cartel that
would not have been reported under the EU Leniency Program. This desirable eﬀect
occurs if the probability of detection exceeds a certain threshold above which the ﬁrms
ﬁnd it too costly to sustain a cartel that has a high probability of being detected just
to preserve the other, proﬁtable, cartel. This threshold increases with the ﬁne discount
granted under Amnesty Plus. Hence, while Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may be
good for competition ex post, they may come with an adverse eﬀect ex ante, especially
if the ﬁne discount is large.
My analysis stresses the trade-oﬀ between desistance ex post and desistance ex ante,
created by the Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus programs. Future research should embed
this question in a dynamic framework to take into account the ongoing nature of the
relationship between cartel members. Moreover, a dynamic analysis may also be well
suited to explore the eﬀects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the formation of
cartels.
Chapter 2
Leniency Programs for
Multimarket Firms: The Eﬀect of
Amnesty Plus on Cartel
Formation
joint with Yassine Lefouili
2.1 Introduction
Experience garnered over many years has taught antitrust authorities in the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU) that companies which have been colluding
in one speciﬁc product market are more likely to have engaged in cartel activities in
adjacent markets.
Due to the high diversity of businesses in multinational ﬁrms, cartel activities bear
all the marks of contagion within companies. The probably most well-known example
for such a cross-linked collusive pattern is the vitamin conspiracy. The striking feature
of this complex of infringements is the central role played by Hoﬀmann-La Roche (HLR)
and BASF, the two main vitamin producers, over the course of ten years in virtually every
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cartel aﬀecting the whole extent of bulk vitamin production.1 HLR, BASF and Rhoˆne-
Poulenc instigated the ﬁrst group of cartels which consisted of price ﬁxing agreements
in the markets for vitamins A and E. The initial success of these arrangements inspired
their replication in other vitamin markets. Accordingly, the European Commission (EC)
stated that “the simultaneous existence of the collusive arrangements in the various
vitamins was not a spontaneous or haphazard development, but was conceived and
directed by the same persons at the most senior levels of the companies concerned”.2
Rhoˆne-Poulenc’s disclosure of evidence on collusion in the markets for vitamins A and E
led to the opening of an investigation. However, only the comprehensive collaboration
of BASF with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty Plus Program
led to the successful prosecution of all participants. When Rhoˆne-Poulenc plead guilty
to price ﬁxing in vitamins A and E, it did however not provide any information on its
participation in the vitamin D3 infringement and even pursued cartel activities in other
product markets such as methionine and methylglucamine.3
In 1999, the DoJ implemented the Amnesty Plus Program as part of its Corporate
Leniency Policy in response to the increasing number of repeat oﬀenders. According to
Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement for
encouraging companies who are already under investigation to report the full extent of
their antitrust crimes [. . .]” (Hammond, 2004, p.16).
Leniency programs cancel the ﬁne against the ﬁrst cartel member that brings decisive
evidence to the antitrust authority. Amnesty Plus aims at attracting amnesty applica-
tions by encouraging subjects of ongoing investigations to consider whether they qualify
for amnesty in other than the currently inspected markets. In particular, Amnesty Plus
oﬀers a ﬁrm, which plea-bargains an agreement for participation in one cartel, where it
cannot obtain amnesty, complete immunity in a second cartel aﬀecting another market.
Provided that the ﬁrm agrees to fully cooperate in the investigation of the conspiracy
of which the DoJ was previously not aware, it is automatically granted amnesty for this
second oﬀense. Moreover, the company beneﬁts from a “substantial additional discount”
1Concerned were the markets for vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B3 (niacin), B4 (choline chloride), B5, B6,
B9 (folic acid), B12, C, D3, H (biotin), beta carotene, carotenoids and premixes.
2EC IP/01/1625 November 2001, p.2.
3EC IP/01/1625 and OJ L 6 of 10.1.2003, p.1-89; EC IP/02/976 and OJ L 255, 08.10.2003, p.1-32;
EC IP/02/1746 and OJ L 38, 10.2.2004, p.18-46.
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(Hammond, 2006, p.10), i.e. the Plus, in the calculation of its ﬁne in any plea agreement
for the initial matter under investigation.
Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus does not exist. Although the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended the
inclusion of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the EU Leniency Program, the
EC did not seize the opportunity to follow the US example by adopting a similar policy.
Also in 2006, the EC failed to incorporate Amnesty Plus in the reform package.
The present chapter studies how the Amnesty Plus policy aﬀects ﬁrms’ incentives
to form a cartel. Following a conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus may encourage
ﬁrms to report another cartel by granting the ﬁrst ﬁrm which applies for this program a
discount on the ﬁne already imposed. Ex ante, however, the opportunity to beneﬁt from
Amnesty Plus may decrease the expected ﬁne in one market and make the formation of
a cartel - not in this - but in another market, more attractive.
We study two markets in which two identical ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely repeated game
of collusion. In each period, the ﬁrms can choose to form a cartel before interacting
in the product market. Collusion generates incriminating evidence which the antitrust
authority can discover with some probability. Each ﬁrm can also bring this evidence to
the authority. When a cartel is detected, each cartel member, except the ﬁrst reporting
ﬁrm, pays a ﬁne. Amnesty Plus sets in when the ﬁrms decide whether to report the
second cartel after having been convicted in the ﬁrst market.
Our main result is that Amnesty Plus can increase the extent of collusion if the
discount on the ﬁne imposed for the initial infringement exceeds the ﬁne the Amnesty
Plus applicant would have incurred in the second market. To avoid this adverse eﬀect,
the design of the Amnesty Plus policy must respect a discount-setting rule that ﬁxes the
discount in the ﬁrst market equal or below the ﬁne in the second market. A leniency
policy with an Amnesty Plus program that sticks to this rule always performs weakly
better, in terms of cartel deterrence, than a standard leniency policy without Amnesty
Plus. The reason is that Amnesty Plus may induce the reporting of the second cartel
after a ﬁrst detection. Increased desistance from cartel activities in the reporting stage
reduces the value of joint collusion provided that the ﬁne discount does not increase the
expected collusive value at this stage.
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Recent theoretical contributions such as Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007),
Aubert, Kovacic, and Rey (2006), Spagnolo (2004) and Motta and Polo (2003) study the
trade-oﬀ leniency generates between less cartel stability through reporting and more car-
tel stability through reporting beneﬁts which lower expected ﬁnes. The overall conclusion
is that leniency programs, if properly designed, make collusion more diﬃcult.4 Several
studies suggest that positive rewards may further strengthen the deterrence power of
leniency programs (Aubert, Kovacic, and Rey, 2006; Spagnolo, 2004).
Amnesty Plus is equivalent to a leniency program, coupled with a positive reward
for the ﬁrst informant, that is available in one market - say market 2 - only if the
cartel in market 1 is discovered. Amnesty Plus, unlike a standard leniency program,
therefore strategically links two markets. The reward can stabilize cartel 2 if cartel 1
is formed and hence increase the extent of collusion. This market linkage also has an
important implication for the procompetitive potential of Amnesty Plus. Contrary to a
standard leniency program, Amnesty Plus may destabilize a cartel even if the probability
of detection in that market is zero. Detection must just be likely enough in the other
market. Amnesty Plus may thus be particularly useful when probabilities of detection
diﬀer across markets.
Another strand of literature closely linked to our analysis studies the role of multi-
market contact between ﬁrms in sustaining collusion when there is no antitrust enforce-
ment. In their seminal paper, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) give theoretical support
to the informal argument, ﬁrst raised by Edwards (1955), that multimarket contact may
enhance collusion. They show that the ﬁrms can pool the incentive constraints of the
diﬀerent markets where they operate in order to transfer slack from a more to a less
collusive market. At worst, with identical ﬁrms and markets, multimarket contact does
not aﬀect the opportunities for cooperation. At best, it facilitates collusion.5
In a recent paper, Choi and Gerlach (2009a) examine the sustainability of collusion
in two markets linked by demand relationships. They ﬁnd that successful prosecution in
one market may destabilize collusion in the adjacent market if products are substitutes,
4See also Miller (2009), Goeree and Helland (2009) and Brenner (2009) for empirical studies and
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq, and Spagnolo (2009), Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Apesteguia,
Dufwenberg, and Selten (2003) for experiments.
5Multimarket contact can also lower ﬁrms’ payoﬀs if it is combined with imperfect monitoring. See
Thomas and Willig (2006).
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whereas in the case of complements, successful prosecution in one market may increase
cartel stability in the adjacent market. Choi and Gerlach (2009b) focus on substitutes
and show that, if there is one local authority per market, free-rider problems, that
arise due to positive prosecution externalities in each market, can only be solved by
coordinating enforcement eﬀorts across jurisdictions. Although both studies combine
multimarket contact with antitrust enforcement, they do not analyze the strategic eﬀects
generated by Amnesty Plus or even leniency programs in this context.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 analyze cartel formation. Section 2.5 extends our analysis to the
case of heterogenous detection probabilities, partial collusion and more than 2 ﬁrms and
2 markets. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Set-up
We consider two markets, 1 and 2, in which two identical ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely repeated
game where, in each period, they can choose to form a cartel before interacting in the
product market. Communication is necessary for collusion and generates hard evidence
which makes it possible to establish the antitrust oﬀense.6 Markets 1 and 2 diﬀer in
proﬁtability. In particular, market 1 is more proﬁtable than market 2. Firms discount
future payoﬀs by a common discount factor 훿 ∈ [0, 1[. We compare the ﬁrms’ decisions
to form cartels under the EU and the US antitrust legislations whose sole diﬀerence here
is that the latter comprises an Amnesty Plus program.
Throughout the analysis we use the following notation: We refer to variables of a
speciﬁc market by using the indices 1 and 2. When considering any of the two markets,
we use the index 푘, and we refer to the other market by using the index −푘.
In each period, the fully collusive joint proﬁt in market 푘 is 2휋푘 > 0, and thus, each
ﬁrm makes a cartel proﬁt equal to 휋푘.
7 If the ﬁrms compete, they make zero proﬁts. In
6For collusion to be illegal, there must be evidence of an explicit agreement between the ﬁrms (Mc-
Cutcheon, 1997). The view that collusion is self-enforcing but requires communication is common in the
literature on leniency programs. See Aubert, Kovacic, and Rey (2006).
7We focus on full collusion in the main analysis and examine partial collusion in extension 2.5.4.
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case one ﬁrm unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement while the other continues
to collude, the deviating ﬁrm earns the whole short-term cartel proﬁt 2휋푘 alone, whereas
the other ﬁrm gets nothing. The ﬁrms use (grim) trigger strategies. The punishment
they agreed upon starts the period following the deviation and lasts forever after.
At the time the ﬁrms decide whether to enter a collusive agreement, they observe the
exogenous per-period conviction probability 푞 > 0 with which the Antitrust Authority
(AA) detects a cartel and convicts the colluding ﬁrms. Detection is independent across
markets and over time.8 Each convicted ﬁrm pays a strictly positive, market speciﬁc ﬁne
퐹푘 which is reduced under Amnesty Plus to 퐹푘 − 푅푘 in return for the disclosure of the
second cartel. 푅푘 ∈ ]0, 퐹푘] represents the ﬁne reduction granted to the ﬁrst informant.
The higher 푅푘 the more generous the Amnesty Plus policy. The successful applicant
receives amnesty in the second infringement because it is the ﬁrst company reporting
in that market. If both ﬁrms simultaneously apply for Amnesty Plus, each is ﬁrst with
probability 12 .
The ﬁnes are such that 퐹1 ≥ 퐹2.
9 We assume that the ﬁne-proﬁt ratio is higher
for market 2 than for market 1, i.e. 퐹2
휋2
> 퐹1
휋1
. This reﬂects the idea that the ﬁne rises
less than proportionally with the cartel proﬁt. Legislative provisions and ﬁne records
support this assumption.10 Heterogenous ﬁne-proﬁt ratios create heterogenous cartel
formation incentives across markets and thereby a parameter range where, in the absence
8Detection in one market may increase as well as decrease the probability of detection in the other
market. Rollover investigations make a second conviction more likely whereas limited resources of the
AA and increased eﬀorts by the ﬁrms to conceal the remaining conspiracy make it less likely. Assum-
ing independence across markets is equivalent to saying that both eﬀects are equally strong. By the
independence over time assumption we impose stationarity.
9We believe that, in the light of 휋1 > 휋2, the assumption 퐹1 ≥ 퐹2 is plausible. In practice, ﬁnes are
set according to judicial principles which link them to the gravity of the infringement, and thus, to the
nature and importance of the anticompetitive behavior. The latter relates, at least indirectly, to the
collusive overcharge which is, with zero competitive proﬁts, equivalent to cartel proﬁts.
10The ﬁne-proﬁt ratio decreases with market size if small ﬁnes are inﬂated compared to high ﬁnes.
The EU ﬁne setting guidelines suggest that this is the case: First, the basic amount of the ﬁne can be
increased to ensure a suﬃcient deterrent eﬀect of the ﬁne. As a ﬁne of a big absolute size is more likely
to act as a deterrent (e.g. because of high media coverage), the deterrent uplift for a small ﬁne seems to
be relatively bigger than for a high ﬁne. Second, the legal maximum, i.e. 10% of the ﬁrm’s total turnover
in the preceding business year, imposes a cap on large ﬁnes. Hence, the ﬁnes for large cartels are more
likely to be capped than the ﬁnes for smaller cartels. Third, the “multiplier” increases the ﬁnal amount
of the ﬁne if the the Commissioner judges that the turnover of the convicted market is too small, and
thus, the ﬁne too low, relative to the company’s entire turnover. The ﬁne is multiplied by a number,
historically between 2 and 5, to increase the ﬁnancial impact of the penalty. There is also empirical
evidence supporting our hypothesis. In particular, see Combe and Monnier (2009) and Connor (2005).
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of Amnesty Plus, the ﬁrms form only one of the cartels. It is in this range where Amnesty
Plus can deploy a negative eﬀect by inducing the formation of the second cartel.11
We assume that the evidence of collusion lasts for one period. Thus, after a ﬁrm has
deviated from a collusive agreement it is held liable for its cartel behavior and can be
ﬁned until the end of the period in which the deviation occurred.12 Each cartel member
has the possibility to bring the incriminating evidence to the AA. The ﬁrst informant
receives immunity from ﬁnes under a standard leniency program. Again, if both ﬁrms
simultaneously apply for leniency, each is ﬁrst with probability 12 .
Following a cartel conviction, we assume that the AA closely monitors the previously
collusive industry and thus, ﬁrms compete, and they never return back to collusion in
the same market.
2.2.2 Timing
The timing of the game is a version of the time structure used in Chen and Rey (2007),
adapted to multimarket contact. In each period, the structure is as follows:
Stage 0 : Each ﬁrm decides whether to enter a collusive agreement in the market(s)
where no cartel has been previously convicted. If at least one ﬁrm decides not to
collude in market 푘, competition takes place in this market. If this happens in
both markets, the ﬁrms compete, and the game ends for that period. If both ﬁrms
choose to collude in market 푘, their communication leaves some hard evidence.
Stage 1 : Each ﬁrm decides whether to stick to, or to deviate from, the collusive
agreement(s). Its rival does not observe this decision until the end of stage 2.
Stage 2 : Each ﬁrm decides whether to report the evidence it holds in each cartel
to the AA. A cartel is convicted with probability 1 if at least one ﬁrm self-reports.
The ﬁrst informant gets complete immunity from ﬁnes in this market, whereas the
11Note that, instead of heterogenous ﬁne-proﬁt ratios, we could use anything else that creates an
asymmetry between the incentives compatibility constraints.
12The limitation period of the liability for antitrust oﬀenses is generally a positive number of years.
Article 25 of the EC Council Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission can sue for Administrative
Action until ﬁve years from the date of the infringement. Moreover, “[. . .] in the case of continuing or
repeated infringements, time shall begin to run on the day on which the infringement ceases”.
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other ﬁrm has to pay the full ﬁne. If each cartel formed in stage 0 is reported in
this stage, the game ends for this period; otherwise:
Stage 3 : Each cartel formed in stage 0 and not reported in stage 2 is detected
with probability 푞. If the AA does not detect any cartel, the game ends for that
period. If the AA however detects the cartel(s) formed in stage 0 and not reported
in stage 2, the colluding ﬁrms pay the corresponding ﬁnes, and the game ends for
that period. If the ﬁrms have formed both cartels in stage 0 and not reported them
in stage 2, and the AA has detected only one of them, then:
Stage 4 : Each ﬁrm chooses whether to report the remaining cartel.
If Amnesty Plus exists, it is relevant only if the game reaches stage 4. This stage
forms the reporting subgame where, after the detection of cartel 푘, the ﬁrms decide
whether to report the remaining cartel −푘. Amnesty Plus can alter the equilibria of this
subgame and thereby aﬀect the equilibria of the entire game.
Under each leniency policy, we deﬁne a set of strategies corresponding to three
regimes: collusion in one market only, sequential collusion and joint collusion. We
then determine the best collusive (subgame-perfect) symmetric equilibrium of the game
without Amnesty Plus, constituted by these strategies, and compare it to its counterpart
in the game with Amnesty Plus.
2.3 Collusion Under the EU Leniency Program
A strategy is denoted 푠 over a single period and 푆 over all periods. In particular, we
denote 푠0 (푆0) the strategy that consists of competing over one period (all periods).
2.3.1 Collusion in One Market
To analyze collusion in only one market, we consider the following strategies:
푠푘: collude in market 푘 only, neither deviate from the collusive agreement nor report.
푆푘: play 푠푘 in 푡 = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from the collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; otherwise play 푠0 for the
remaining periods.
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The cartel in market 푘 is individually stable, i.e. (푆푘, 푆푘) is an equilibrium, if and
only if the gain from any unilateral deviation does not exceed the present discounted
expected payoﬀ 푉푘(훿) when both ﬁrms play 푆푘. 푉푘(훿) is recursively deﬁned as
푉푘(훿) = 푞(휋푘 − 퐹푘) + (1− 푞)(휋푘 + 훿푉푘(훿))
which we rewrite as
푉푘(훿) =
휋푘 − 푞퐹푘
1− 훿(1− 푞)
In the presence of a leniency policy where the ﬁrst informant pays no ﬁne, the optimal
unilateral deviation is to deviate from and to immediately report the collusive agreement.
This deviation yields a payoﬀ equal to 2휋푘. Both deviating without reporting and
reporting without deviating yield lower payoﬀs, namely 2휋푘 − 푞퐹푘 and 0. (푆푘, 푆푘) is an
equilibrium if and only if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
푉푘(훿) ≥ 2휋푘
which we rewrite as
훿 ≥ 훿˜푘 ≡
1 + 푞퐹푘
휋푘
2(1− 푞)
The individual stability threshold 훿˜푘 is increasing in 푞 and
퐹푘
휋푘
. Intuitively, the higher
the probability of conviction and the higher the ﬁne-proﬁt ratio, the more ﬁrms have to
value future ﬂows of collusive proﬁts, and thus, the higher the discount factor needed
to individually sustain the cartel. Our assumption 퐹2
휋2
> 퐹1
휋1
implies that 훿˜2 > 훿˜1, i.e.
a cartel in market 2 is harder to sustain than a cartel in the more proﬁtable market 1.
Finally, we assume that 푞 < 휋22휋2+퐹2 . Otherwise, cartel 2 would be individually unstable
for any value 훿 ∈ [0, 1[.13
13The probability of detection seems to be quite low also in reality. Bryant and Eckard (1991) estimate
the maximum probability of getting caught by the US authorities in any given year at 13% to 17%.
Combe, Monnier, and Legal (2008) ﬁnd around 13% for a European sample.
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2.3.2 Sequential Collusion
Sequential collusion refers to a situation in which the ﬁrms collude in only one market
as long as they go undetected. After a detection in this market, they switch to collusion
in the other market. We consider the following strategy:
푆푘→−푘: play 푠푘 in 푡 = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from the collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; if there is detection but no
deviation from the collusive agreement in 푡, play 푠−푘 in 푡 + 1 and in any subsequent
period as long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreement nor reporting
nor detection; in all other cases, play 푠0 for the remaining periods.
We focus on the sequential strategy 푆1→2.
14 The cartels are sequentially stable, i.e.
(푆1→2, 푆1→2) is an equilibrium, if and only if no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate both
when collusion occurs in market 1 and when it occurs in market 2. Each ﬁrm’s present
discounted expected payoﬀ 푉1→2(훿) when both ﬁrms play 푆1→2 is recursively deﬁned as
푉1→2(훿) = 푞 (휋1 − 퐹1 + 훿푉2(훿)) + (1− 푞) (휋1 + 훿푉1→2(훿))
which can be rewritten as
푉1→2(훿) = 푉1(훿) + 푞
훿
1− 훿(1− 푞)
푉2(훿)
(푆1→2, 푆1→2) is an equilibrium if and only if the following incentive compatibility con-
straints hold:
푉1→2(훿) ≥ 2휋1
푉2(훿) ≥ 2휋2
It is straightforward that the latter constraint implies the former and thus, (푆1→2, 푆1→2)
is an equilibrium if and only if cartel 2 is individually stable, i.e. 훿 ≥ 훿˜2.
14In appendix 2.A we show that there exists 푞˜ > 0 such that (푆2→1, 푆2→1) can never be the best
collusive equilibrium if 푞 < 푞˜. Throughout the chapter we assume that the latter condition holds. This
assumption has no qualitative implications for the analysis of the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus but eases the
exposition by eliminating (푆2→1, 푆2→1) as a possible candidate for the best collusive equilibrium.
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2.3.3 Joint Collusion
To study simultaneous collusion in both markets, we consider the following strategies:
푠12: collude in both markets, neither deviate from any of the collusive agreements nor
report.
푆12: play 푠12 in 푡 = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from any collusive agreement nor reporting nor detection; if there is detection of cartel 푘
but neither deviation from any collusive agreement nor reporting in 푡, play 푠−푘 in 푡+1,
and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation from the collusive
agreement in market −푘 nor reporting nor detection, if cartel −푘 is individually stable;
in all other cases, play 푠0 for the remaining periods.
The two cartels are jointly stable under the EU policy, i.e. (푆12, 푆12) is an equilib-
rium, if and only if the gain from any unilateral deviation does not exceed the present
discounted expected value 푉12(훿) when both ﬁrms play 푆12. We denote 푉12(훿) the ‘value
of joint collusion’ for the EU. The strategy 푆12 involves multimarket punishment. If
one ﬁrm unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement in one of the markets, the
co-conspirator reverts to competition in both markets. The optimal unilateral deviation
is then to deviate from the collusive agreements in both markets simultaneously and
report both cartels. This deviation ensures a payoﬀ equal to 2휋1 + 2휋2. (푆12, 푆12) is an
equilibrium if and only if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
푉12(훿) ≥ 2휋1 + 2휋2
The value of joint collusion depends on whether the cartels are individually stable. There
are three cases:
a- If cartel 1 is individually stable while cartel 2 is not, i.e. 훿˜1 ≤ 훿 < 훿˜2, the value of joint
collusion is recursively deﬁned as
푉12(훿) = 푞
2(휋1 + 휋2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2) + 푞(1− 푞)(휋1 + 휋2 − 퐹1)
+ 푞(1− 푞) (휋1 + 휋2 − 퐹2 + 훿푉1(훿)) + (1− 푞)
2 (휋1 + 휋2 + 훿푉12(훿))
From the independence assumption on the AA’s detection technology it follows that the
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probability of detecting both cartels during a speciﬁc period is 푞2, only cartel 1 (cartel
2) is 푞(1− 푞), and none of the cartels (1− 푞)2. If the AA detects cartel 1, the ﬁrms stop
forming the individually unstable cartel 2. We rewrite the value of joint collusion as
푉12(훿) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
(2.1)
b- If both cartels are individually unstable, i.e. 훿 < 훿˜1, the value of joint collusion is
푉12(훿) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
(2.2)
c- If both cartels are individually stable, i.e. 훿˜2 ≤ 훿 < 1, the value of joint collusion is
푉12(훿) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)
(2.3)
2.3.4 Best Collusive Equilibrium
Proposition 1 characterizes the Pareto dominant equilibrium under the EU antitrust
policy.
Proposition 1 There exists a joint stability threshold 훿˜12 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿˜2] such that:
- If 훿 < 훿˜1, the competitive equilibrium (푆0, 푆0) is the only equilibrium.
- If 훿˜1 ≤ 훿 < 훿˜12, the individual collusion equilibrium (푆1, 푆1) is the best collusive equi-
librium.
- If 훿˜12 ≤ 훿 < 1, the joint collusion equilibrium (푆12, 푆12) is the best collusive equilibrium.
Proof See appendix 2.C.
Over the interval [훿˜12, 1[, the expected lifespan of cartel 2 depends on the size of 훿.
For 훿 ∈ [훿˜12, 훿˜2[, cartel 2 is sustained only as long as the AA does not detect any of the
cartels, whereas for 훿 ∈ [훿˜2, 1[, cartel 2 is sustained up to its own detection.
By linking the punishment across markets, the ﬁrms can potentially transfer slack
enforcement power from market 1 to market 2 and sustain collusion in both markets for
values of 훿 < 훿˜2, i.e. even when cartel 2 is individually unstable. Multimarket contact has
this procollusive eﬀect if and only if 훿˜12 < 훿˜2. In appendix 2.B, we provide a necessary
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and suﬃcient condition for the latter inequality to hold and discuss how the possibility
of cartel detection aﬀects the procollusive potential of multimarket contact.
2.4 Collusion Under the US Leniency Program
We now introduce Amnesty Plus and examine its eﬀect, ﬁrst, on the equilibrium of the
reporting subgame in stage 4 and, second, on the best collusive equilibrium of the entire
game.
2.4.1 Reporting Subgame
In the absence of Amnesty Plus, the subgame exhibits two possible equilibria if cartel
푘 is detected in the previous stage: Both ﬁrms reporting and both ﬁrms not reporting
the remaining cartel. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is to not report the remaining
cartel −푘 because each ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is −12퐹−푘 if both ﬁrms report compared to
zero (when cartel −푘 is individually unstable) and 훿푉−푘 (when cartel −푘 is individually
stable) if none reports. As the ﬁrms do not report in the Pareto dominant equilibrium,
they only desist from cartel −푘 if it is individually unstable. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show
the payoﬀ matrices of this subgame.
F1, F2 R NR
R − 1
2
퐹푘,−
1
2
퐹푘 0,−퐹푘
NR −퐹푘,0 0,0
Figure 2.1: Cartel 푘 unstable
F1, F2 R NR
R − 1
2
퐹푘,−
1
2
퐹푘 0,−퐹푘
NR −퐹푘,0 훿푉푘,훿푉푘
Figure 2.2: Cartel 푘 stable
Amnesty Plus may alter the ﬁrms’ reporting decisions by creating a prisoners’ dilemma
where reporting cartel −푘 forms an equilibrium in dominant strategies. If a ﬁrm antici-
pates that its partner reports, it always prefers reporting. If a ﬁrm anticipates that its
co-conspirator does not report, it prefers to report for any ﬁne reduction 푅푘 if cartel
−푘 is individually unstable (Figure 2.3) because it gets a strictly positive 푅푘 from re-
porting versus zero from not reporting. If cartel −푘 is individually stable, a ﬁrm, which
anticipates that its partner does not report, ﬁnds it (strictly) optimal to report if and
only if 푅푘 > 훿푉−푘(훿) (Figure 2.4). Not reporting would imply the renewed formation
of the cartel in the next period and is therefore dominated by reporting only if the ﬁne
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reduction exceeds the present discounted expected payoﬀ a ﬁrm gets from this cartel.
It is in these two cases where the problem of Amnesty Plus becomes apparent: While
Amnesty Plus induces the ﬁrms to make the desired reporting decision, it may increase
each ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ 푋 = 12(푅푘 − 퐹−푘) above the equilibrium payoﬀ in the
subgame under the EU policy. Amnesty Plus may therefore raise the value of collusion
over the entire game.
F1, F2 R NR
R 푋,푋 푅−푘,−퐹푘
NR −퐹푘,푅−푘 0,0
Figure 2.3: Cartel 푘 unstable
F1, F2 R NR
R 푋,푋 푅−푘,−퐹푘
NR −퐹푘,푅−푘 훿푉푘,훿푉푘
Figure 2.4: Cartel 푘 stable
Amnesty Plus does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ decisions to not report an individually stable
cartel if 푅푘 ≤ 훿푉−푘(훿). The subgame exhibits again two possible equilibria, but not
reporting Pareto dominates reporting because 12(푅푘 − 퐹−푘) < 푅푘 ≤ 훿푉−푘(훿). Notice
that we can rewrite 푅푘 ≤ 훿푉−푘(훿) as
훿 ≥ 훿ˆ−푘(푅푘) ≡
푅푘
휋−푘 − 푞퐹−푘 + (1− 푞)푅푘
where 훿ˆ−푘(푅푘) deﬁnes a robustness threshold for an individually stable cartel −푘 such
that, above this threshold, it is robust to, and thus, survives the detection of cartel 푘.
2.4.2 Joint Collusion
Amnesty Plus cannot alter strategy proﬁles that do not involve simultaneous collusive
interaction in the two markets. Hence, the strategies 푠0, 푠푘, 푆0, 푆푘 and 푆1→2 are identi-
cal with and without Amnesty Plus. The strategy proﬁle for joint collusion is now given
by:
푠퐴푃12 : collude in both markets, neither deviate from any of the collusive agreements
nor report; if there is detection of one cartel, do not report the remaining cartel under
Amnesty Plus if it is individually stable and robust, otherwise report.
푆퐴푃12 : play 푠
퐴푃
12 in 푡 = 0 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation
from any of the collusive agreements nor reporting nor detection; if there is detection
of cartel 푘 but neither deviation from any collusive agreement nor reporting in 푡, play
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푠−푘 in 푡+1, and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither deviation from the
collusive agreement in market −푘 nor reporting nor detection, if cartel −푘 is individually
stable and robust; in all other cases, play 푠0 for the remaining periods.
The two cartels are jointly stable under the US policy, i.e. (푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) is an equilib-
rium, if and only if the gain from any unilateral deviation does not exceed the present
discounted expected value 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) when both ﬁrms play 푆
퐴푃
12 . We denote 푉12(훿)
the ‘value of joint collusion’ for the US. Here again, the optimal unilateral deviation
is to deviate from the collusive agreements in both markets and report both cartels.
(푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) is an equilibrium if and only if the following incentive compatibility con-
straint holds:
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) ≥ 2휋1 + 2휋2
The value of joint collusion depends on the outcome of the reporting subgame in stage
4. There are four diﬀerent cases:
a- If cartel 1 is stable and robust while cartel 2 is either unstable or stable but not robust,
i.e. max(훿˜1, 훿ˆ1(푅2)) ≤ 훿 < max(훿˜2, 훿ˆ2(푅1)), both ﬁrms report cartel 2 but not cartel 1
in the reporting subgame. 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) is thus recursively deﬁned as
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) = 푞
2(휋1 + 휋2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2) + 푞(1− 푞)
(
휋1 + 휋2 − 퐹1 +
1
2
(푅1 − 퐹2)
)
+ 푞(1− 푞) (휋1 + 휋2 − 퐹2 + 훿푉1) + (1− 푞)
2
(
휋1 + 휋2 + 훿푉
퐴푃
12 (훿,푅1, 푅2)
)
which we rewrite as
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
(2.4)
b- If cartel 2 is stable and robust and cartel 1 is stable but not robust, i.e. max(훿˜2, 훿ˆ2(푅1)) ≤
훿 < max(훿˜1, 훿ˆ1(푅2)), the value of joint collusion is
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅2 − 퐹1)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
(2.5)
c- If both cartels are either individually unstable or individually stable but not robust,
i.e. 훿 < (훿˜푘, 훿ˆ푘(푅−푘)) for both 푘 = 1, 2, Amnesty Plus induces the ﬁrms to report and
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the value of joint collusion is
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 +푅2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
(2.6)
d- If both cartels are individually stable and robust, i.e. 훿 ≥ (훿˜푘, 훿ˆ푘(푅−푘)) for both
푘 = 1, 2, the ﬁrms do not report these cartels, and the value of joint collusion is
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)
(2.7)
2.4.3 Best Collusive Equilibrium
Amnesty Plus may enhance desistance through reporting and is therefore beneﬁcial
for competition after a ﬁrst cartel conviction. It may however generate potentially
conﬂicting eﬀects at the stage of cartel formation: First, the desistance eﬀect which
occurs if Amnesty Plus induces the ﬁrms to report, and thus terminate, an individually
stable collusive agreement after a ﬁrst detection. This eﬀect is either negative, i.e. it
reduces the value of joint collusion, or zero. Second, the reporting eﬀect which captures
the expected equilibrium beneﬁts from reporting under Amnesty Plus. This eﬀect is
either negative or zero or positive. We explore the net eﬀect of Amnesty Plus in detail
in the subsequent analysis.
Neutrality of Amnesty Plus on Global Competition
Consider the interval [0, 훿˜1[. Amnesty Plus is neutral, and the only equilibrium is
(푆0, 푆0). To see this, note that if Amnesty Plus were to have an eﬀect, it would
have to make either individual or joint collusion sustainable, i.e. make either (푆1, 푆1) or
(푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) an equilibrium. The former is clearly impossible because Amnesty Plus is ir-
relevant when ﬁrms collude in one market only. The latter cannot occur as well because,
from the expressions in (2.2) and (2.6), we see that Amnesty Plus weakly decreases the
value of jointly colluding over this interval:
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) = 푉12(훿) +
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 +푅2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
≤ 푉12(훿)
for all 훿 ∈ [0, 훿˜1[.
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The Anticompetitive Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus
Consider the interval [훿˜1, 훿˜12[ where (푆1, 푆1) is the best collusive equilibrium in the EU.
Amnesty Plus is anticompetitive if it induces the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes
(푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) the best collusive equilibrium, for discount factor values in this interval.
This can happen only if Amnesty Plus increases the value of joint collusion.
Lemma 1 Amnesty Plus increases the value of joint collusion for 훿 in the interval
[훿˜1, 훿˜12[ if and only if cartel 1 is robust and the ﬁne discount granted in market 1 in
return for the disclosure of cartel 2 exceeds the ﬁne that would have otherwise been
imposed for the reported cartel 2:
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) > 푉12(훿)⇐⇒ 훿 ≥ 훿ˆ1(푅2) and 푅1 > 퐹2
Proof See appendix 2.C.
The net eﬀect of Amnesty Plus is equal to 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2)−푉12(훿). If this diﬀerence
is positive, Amnesty Plus is potentially anticompetitive. If cartel 1 is robust, the value
of joint collusion is given by equation (2.4) for the US and by equation (2.1) for the EU.
We can separate the diﬀerence of these two expressions into the desistance (Δ퐷) and
the reporting (Δ푅) eﬀects of Amnesty Plus:
Δ퐷 =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
−
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
−
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
= 0 (2.8)
Δ푅 =
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
<>= 0
The desistance eﬀect is zero because Amnesty Plus does not induce the reporting of the
individually stable cartel 1 in this case. However, if 푅1 > 퐹2, the reporting eﬀect is
strictly positive and Amnesty Plus increases the value of joint collusion.
Proposition 2 (푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) is the best collusive equilibrium for a non-empty range of
values of 훿 in the interval [훿˜1, 훿˜12[ if and only if
푅2 < 푅¯2 ≡
훿˜12(휋1 − 푞퐹1)
1− 훿˜12(1− 푞)
(2.9)
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푅1 > R
¯ 1
≡ 퐹2 +
2
(
1− 훿˜12(1− 푞)
2
)
푞(1− 푞)
[
2휋1 + 2휋2 − 푉12(훿˜
−
12)
]
(2.10)
Proof See Appendix 2.C.
Proposition 2 is central to this chapter. It suggests that situations occur in which
Amnesty Plus stabilizes the previously unstable cartel 2 and thereby increases the extent
of collusion. If the ﬁne in market 2 is small such that 퐹2 < 푅¯2, condition (2.9) always
holds because of our assumption that 푅푘 ≤ 퐹푘.
15 Amnesty Plus is then anticompetitive
if the AA over-rewards applicants by granting a reduction 푅1 in return for the reporting
of cartel 2 that is too high. Condition (2.10) boils down to 푅1 > 퐹2 if multimarket
contact is procollusive, i.e. 훿˜12 < 훿˜2.
16 An agency that acts optimally would not agree
to such a large discount. However, an agency that maximizes the number of convicted
cartels rather than minimizing the number of cartels formed deﬁnitely has incentives to
over-reward. As the number of cartels deterred is unobservable, an antitrust authority
can only be assessed based on observable measures of performance such as the number
of successfully prosecuted cartels. Maximal deterrence, though socially desirable, may
therefore not be the primary objective of an antitrust authority (Harrington, 2010).
Corollary 1 Amnesty Plus has no anticompetitive eﬀect on cartel formation if the ﬁne
discount granted in market 푘 in return for the disclosure of cartel −푘 does not exceed the
ﬁne that would have otherwise been imposed for the reported cartel −푘, i.e. 푅푘 ≤ 퐹−푘.
Proof The second term of the right hand side in condition (2.10) of Proposition 2 is
weakly positive. A ﬁne reduction 푅푘 ≤ 퐹−푘 violates this condition.
Corollary 1 suggests that the AA can avoid a procollusive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus
by ﬁxing ﬁne discounts such that 푅푘 ≤ 퐹−푘. This result is crucial because it gives us
a clear-cut policy rule which relies only on parameters set by the authority itself. The
discount-setting rule is therefore easy to implement.
15If we suppose that there exists an increasing and continuous function g(.), verifying g(0)=0, such
that 퐹푘 ≤ 푔(휋푘), condition (2.9) always holds for a suﬃciently small market 2.
16If 훿˜12 < 훿˜2 then 푉12(훿˜
−
12
) = 2휋1+2휋2 while, if 훿˜12 = 훿˜2, this may not be true because it may happen
that 푉12(훿˜
−
12
) < 2휋1 + 2휋2 ≤ 푉12(훿˜12).
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The Procompetitive Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus
Consider now the interval [훿˜12, 1[ where (푆12, 푆12) is the best collusive equilibrium in
the EU. Amnesty Plus is procompetitive if it either prevents or defers the formation of
cartel 2, i.e. if it makes either (푆1, 푆1) or (푆1→2, 푆1→2) the best collusive equilibrium. We
divide this interval into two sub-intervals. We ﬁrst examine [훿˜12, 훿˜2[ where only cartel 1
is individually stable and Amnesty Plus can completely deter the formation of cartel 2,
and second [훿˜2, 1[ where both cartels are individually stable and Amnesty Plus can only
defer the formation of cartel 2. We focus on a situation where multimarket contact is
procollusive such that 훿˜12 < 훿˜2.
Amnesty Plus prevents the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (푆1, 푆1) the best
collusive equilibrium, for at least some values of 훿 in the interval [훿˜12, 훿˜2[ if and only if it
lowers the value of joint collusion such that forming both cartels is no longer incentive
compatible. Note that Amnesty Plus neutralizes the procollusive eﬀect of multimarket
contact in this case.
Proposition 3 Amnesty Plus prevents the formation of cartel 2 for a non-empty range
of values of 훿 in the interval [훿˜12, 훿˜2[ if and only if 푅2 > 푅¯2 or 푅1 < 퐹2:
- If 푅2 > 푅¯2, (푆1, 푆1) is the best collusive equilibrium for a non-empty range of values
of 훿 in the interval [훿˜12, 훿˜2[ for any 푅1 > 0.
- If 푅2 ≤ 푅¯2, (푆1, 푆1) is the best collusive equilibrium for a non-empty range of values
of 훿 in the interval [훿˜12, 훿˜2[ if and only if 푅1 < 퐹2.
Proof See appendix 2.C.
Proposition 3 suggests that, for a high enough ﬁne discount 푅2, Amnesty Plus causes
desistance and thereby lowers the value of joint collusion such that forming both cartels
is no longer incentive compatible for some values of 훿. If, however, 푅2 is too low to
induce desistance, the reporting eﬀect in market 2 must be strictly negative to break
joint collusion. In the ﬁrst case, cartel 1 is not robust for values of 훿 close enough to
훿˜12. The value of joint collusion is given in (2.6) for the US and in (2.1) for the EU.
Separating the diﬀerence of these expressions into the desistance and reporting eﬀects,
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we get
Δ퐷 =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
−
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
< 0 (2.11)
Δ푅 =
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 +푅2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
≤ 0
Amnesty Plus induces reporting in stage 4. Each ﬁrm’s expected reporting beneﬁts are
(푅1+푅2−퐹1−퐹2)/2 which must be weakly negative because 푅푘 ≤ 퐹푘. Desistance from
the stable cartel 1 after the detection of cartel 2 strictly lowers the value of joint collusion.
Amnesty Plus therefore prevents the formation of cartel 2 for any ﬁne discount 푅1 if 훿
is close enough to 훿˜12. In the second case, cartel 1 is robust for all 훿 in this interval.
The desistance and reporting eﬀects are given by the expressions in (2.8). Amnesty Plus
can induce the reporting of only the unstable cartel 2 and therefore has no eﬀect on
desistance. However, if 푅1 < 퐹2, Amnesty Plus lowers the value of joint collusion and
may prevent the formation of cartel 2.
Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (푆1→2, 푆1→2) the best
collusive equilibrium, for at least some values of 훿 in the interval [훿˜2, 1[ if and only if it
lowers the value of jointly colluding such that either joint collusion is no more incentive
compatible or is Pareto dominated by sequential collusion. We give here the intuitive
arguments and provide the detailed formal analysis in appendix 2.D.
Let us ﬁrst sketch under what conditions joint collusion is no more incentive com-
patible. Loosely speaking, (푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) is not an equilibrium for a non-empty range of
values of 훿 in the interval [훿˜2, 1[ if 푅1 and 푅2 take intermediate values. On the one hand,
at least one of the ﬁne reductions must be high enough such that both ﬁrms report
the remaining stable cartel in the reporting subgame of stage 4. On the other hand,
the same ﬁne reduction that induces the reporting must be low enough such that the
decrease in the expected ﬁne does not compensate the ﬁrms for the enhanced desistance.
If (푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) is not an equilibrium, (푆1→2, 푆1→2) is the best collusive equilibrium in
this interval.
Let us now intuitively explain why the sequential equilibrium may Pareto dominate
the joint equilibrium if the ﬁrms’ discount factor is suﬃciently close to 1. Amnesty
Plus, if it induces both ﬁrms to report, erases future collusive proﬁts in the remaining
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market. This is however not the case when ﬁrms collude sequentially. If the ﬁrms highly
value current collusive proﬁts and care less about the future, i.e. their 훿 is relatively low,
they prefer to collude in both markets today and to incur the risk of being forced to
globally compete in the future. If, however, the ﬁrms highly value future proﬁts, they
may be willing to sacriﬁce cartel proﬁts today in return for a longer expected duration
of collusion. (푆1→2, 푆1→2) is then the best collusive equilibrium in this interval.
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Heterogenous Detection Probabilities
Amnesty Plus strategically links two markets. The direct consequence of this linkage
is that Amnesty Plus may deploy its eﬀects for parameter values where a standard
leniency program cannot inﬂuence collusion at all. To see this, suppose that 푞1 > 0 and
푞2 = 0. Possible reasons for this diﬀerence may be e.g. that the AA concentrates on the
discovery of big cartels or that consumers are more sensible to prices of a product with
an important sales’ volume and thus are more likely to complain to the authority about
the prices in market 1. With 푞2 = 0 a standard leniency program has no eﬀect in market
2. This is however not true for Amnesty Plus. Amnesty Plus induces the reporting of
the stable cartel 2 after the detection of cartel 1 if the size of the ﬁne discount granted
in market 1 is greater than the continuation value from colluding in market 2, which
may happen even if 푞2 = 0. Hence, provided that detection in market 1 occurs with a
suﬃciently high probability, Amnesty Plus may deter the formation of cartel 2 even for
푞2 = 0.
2.5.2 More than two Firms
Consider 푛 identical ﬁrms active on markets 1 and 2. Assume that if all the ﬁrms report
the remaining cartel simultaneously in stage 4, each ﬁrm is ﬁrst with probability 1
푛
. As
only the ﬁrst informant is eligible for the ﬁne discount under Amnesty Plus, a ﬁrm’s
expected payoﬀ from reporting cartel −푘, when everyone else does, is 1
푛
푅푘 −
푛−1
푛
퐹−푘.
We have 1
푛
[푅푘 − (푛 − 1)퐹−푘] ≤ 0 if and only if 푅푘 ≤ (푛 − 1)퐹−푘. Hence, to avoid
a potential anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus, the AA would have to set the ﬁne
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reductions such that 푅푘 ≤ (푛− 1)퐹−푘.
17 This constraint becomes slacker as the number
of ﬁrms increases. Collusion however tends to be more important in highly concentrated
markets, due to eased coordination and monitoring, than in markets where many small
ﬁrms operate (Tirole, 1988). Moreover, if the AA wants to include a discount-setting
rule in its amnesty plus policy that depends only on variables set by itself then it should
set up this rule to avoid the anticompetitive eﬀect for any possible number of ﬁrms. As
the worst case scenario occurs for 푛 = 2, the authority should adopt the rule 푅푘 ≤ 퐹−푘.
2.5.3 More than two Markets
Consider a set 푀 of markets in which two identical ﬁrms interact. Denote ∣푀 ∣ = 푚 ≥ 2
the number of markets. For a subset of markets 퐾 ⊆ 푀 denote Π퐾 the total proﬁt
each ﬁrm earns from collusion and 퐹퐾 the total ﬁne each ﬁrm pays if the AA detects
the cartels in the subset 퐾.18 For a subset of markets 퐿 ⊆ 푀 ∖퐾 let 푅퐿퐾 be the ﬁne
discount the ﬁrst ﬁrm gets under Amnesty Plus in return for reporting the cartels in
subset 퐿. Assume that 푅퐿퐾 ≤ 푅
퐿′
퐾 if 퐿 ⊆ 퐿
′.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the strategies we consider under a leniency policy without Amnesty
Plus. For any subset of markets 퐼 ⊆푀 denote 푠퐼 the following strategy over one period:
collude in the subset 퐼, neither deviate from the collusive agreements nor report. In
particular, 푠∅ consists of competing in all markets. We recursively deﬁne the strategies
푆퐼,푡 over the subgame starting from period 푡 and denote 푉퐼(훿) as each ﬁrm’s expected
payoﬀ discounted to period 푡 when both ﬁrms play 푆퐼,푡.
19
푆∅,푡: play 푠∅ in period 푡 and all subsequent periods.
If ∣퐼∣ = 1 then 푆퐼,푡 is the following strategy: play 푠퐼 in period 푡 and any subsequent
17Consider the case of collusive agreements not involving the same set of ﬁrms in both markets.
Denote 푛푘 the number of ﬁrms in cartel 푘 and 푠 the number of ﬁrms partipating in both cartels. If
푠 = 0, Amnesty Plus has no eﬀect. If 푠 ≥ 1, Amnesty Plus can increase the value of collusion for ﬁrms
involved in both cartels, but whenever this happens it will also decrease the expected cartel proﬁts for
ﬁrms colluding in one market only. To avoid any increase in the expected proﬁt of every ﬁrm, it must
hold that 푅푘 ≤ (푠− 1)퐹−푘, which can be satisﬁed for strictly positive discounts only if 푠 > 1. However,
if we consider the weaker (and more relevant) requirement that Amnesty Plus should not increase the
total value of each cartel then the discount-setting rule 푅푘 ≤ (푛−푘 − 1)퐹−푘 is suﬃcient.
18In this extension, we allow for substitutability and complementarity between markets, and thus, Π퐾
need not equal the sum of the proﬁts in each of the markets in subset 퐾. For an analysis of multimarket
collusion with demand linkages see Choi and Gerlach (2009a).
19We use ∣퐼∣ as a recursive variable: the deﬁnition of the collusive strategies over 퐼 ∕= ∅ builds on the
deﬁnitions of the collusive strategies over the sets whose cardinality is strictly less than ∣퐼∣.
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period as long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreement nor reporting
nor detection; if either deviation or reporting or detection occurs in period 푡′ ≥ 푡, play
푆∅,푡′+1.
If ∣퐼∣ ≥ 2 then 푆퐼,푡 is the following strategy: play 푠퐼 in period 푡 and any subsequent
period as long as there is neither deviation from the collusive agreements nor reporting
nor detection; if detection of a subset of markets 퐽 ⊊ 퐼 occurs in some period 푡′ ≥ 푡
but neither deviation from any collusive agreement nor reporting, play 푆퐿(퐼,퐽),푡′+1 where
퐿(퐼, 퐽) ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 is such that 푉퐿(퐼,퐽)(훿) ≥ 푉퐿(훿) for any 퐿 ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 if the set 푅(퐼, 퐽) =
{퐿 ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 / 푉퐿(훿) ≥ 2Π퐿} is not empty and 퐿(퐼, 퐽) = ∅ otherwise; if in some period
푡′′ ≥ 푡 reporting or deviation occurs, or all the cartels are detected, play 푆∅,푡′′+1.
Let us now deﬁne the strategies under a leniency policy with Amnesty Plus. For any
subset of markets 퐼 ⊆푀 we recursively deﬁne the strategy 푠퐴푃퐼 over one period and the
strategies 푆퐴푃퐼,푡 over the subgame starting from period 푡 and note 푉
퐴푃
퐼 (훿) as each ﬁrm’s
expected payoﬀ discounted to period 푡 when both ﬁrms play 푆퐴푃퐼,푡 . For any subset 퐼 such
that ∣퐼∣ ≤ 1, we deﬁne 푠퐴푃퐼 and 푆
퐴푃
퐼,푡 exactly as 푠퐼 and 푆퐼,푡. For any subset 퐼 such that
∣퐼∣ ≥ 2 we deﬁne the strategies 푠퐴푃퐼 and 푆
퐴푃
퐼,푡 as follows:
푠퐴푃퐼 : collude in the subset 퐼, neither deviate from the collusive agreements nor report;
if detection of a subset of markets 퐽 ⊊ 퐼 occurs but neither deviation nor reporting,
then report all the remaining cartels under Amnesty Plus if the set 푅퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = {퐿 ⊆
퐼 ∖ 퐽 / 푉 퐴푃퐿 (훿) ≥ max(2Π퐿,
푅퐼∖퐽
퐽
훿
)} is empty; otherwise, do not report any of the
remaining cartels under Amnesty Plus.
푆퐴푃퐼,푡 : play 푠
퐴푃
퐼 in period 푡 and in any subsequent period as long as there is neither
deviation from the collusive agreements nor detection; if in some period 푡′ ≥ 푡 detection
of a subset 퐽 ⊊ 퐼 occurs but neither deviation nor reporting then play 푆퐴푃
퐿(퐼,퐽),푡′+1 where
퐿퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 is such that 푉 퐴푃
퐿퐴푃 (퐼,퐽)
(훿) ≥ 푉 퐴푃퐿 (훿) for any 퐿 ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 if the set
푅퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) is not empty and 퐿퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = ∅ otherwise; if in some period 푡′′ ≥ 푡 reporting
or deviation occurs, or all the cartels are detected, play 푆퐴푃∅,푡′′+1.
The following proposition gives the natural extension of the discount-setting rule we
suggest in Corollary 1 for 푚 = 2 to the general case with 푚 ≥ 2 markets.
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Proposition 4 If for all 퐾 ⊊푀 and 퐿 ⊆푀 ∖퐾 it holds that:
푅퐿퐾 ≤ 퐹퐿
then for any 퐼 ⊆푀
푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) ≤ 푉퐼(훿)
which rules out any anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation.
Proof See appendix 2.C.
2.5.4 Partial Collusion
In our analysis, we have assumed that the ﬁrms collude at the monopoly price. Indeed,
in our model, if collusion is incentive compatible in both markets, the ﬁrms have no
incentives to collude at a price lower than this because both cartel stability and expected
collusive proﬁts increase in industry proﬁts. Partial collusion may however be optimal
if 훿 ∈ [훿˜1, 훿˜2[. To see this, suppose that, if the ﬁrms collude, they can ﬁx a price
푝푘 ∈ ]푐푘, 푝
푚
푘 ] where 푐푘 is the marginal cost of production and 푝
푚
푘 the monopoly price. We
assume that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function 휋푘(푝푘), when both ﬁrms choose 푝푘, is continuous,
quasi-concave and reaches its maximum at 푝푚푘 < +∞. Furthermore, we denote 푝¯푘 ∈
]푐푘, 푝
푚
푘 [ the unique solution to the equation 휋푘(푝푘)− 푞퐹푘 = 0
Consider ﬁrst the situation for 훿 ∈ [훿˜1, 훿˜2[ under the EU Leniency Program. If both
ﬁrms collude and ﬁx a price 푝1 ∈ ]푐1, 푝
푚
1 ] in market 1 and 푝2 ∈ ]푐2, 푝
푚
2 ] in market 2, each
ﬁrm’s discounted expected total proﬁt is
푉12(푝1, 푝2, 훿) =
휋1(푝1)− 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2(푝2)− 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
Joint collusion at prices (푝1, 푝2) is sustainable if and only if the participation constraint
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푝푘 ≥ 푝¯푘 holds for 푘 = 1, 2 and 푉12(푝1, 푝2, 훿) ≥ 2휋1 + 2휋2 which is equivalent to
휋1(푝1)
(
1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
− 2
)
−
푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+ (2.12)
+ 휋2(푝2)
(
1
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
− 2
)
−
푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
≥ 0
Optimal joint collusion at prices (푝1, 푝2) ∈ [푝¯1, 푝
푚
1 ] × [푝¯2, 푝
푚
2 ] maximizes 푉12(푝1, 푝2, 훿)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint given by (2.12). For all 훿 ∈ [훿˜1, 훿˜2[ the
expression ( 11−훿(1−푞) − 2) is positive because 훿˜1 >
1
2(1−푞) . The left hand side (LHS) of
(2.12) therefore increases in 푝1 which implies that full collusion in market 1, i.e. 푝1 = 푝
푚
1 ,
is always optimal when jointly colluding. This, however, need not be true for market
2 because the LHS of the inequality in (2.12) decreases in 푝2 if 훿 < 훿¯ =
1
2(1−푞)2
. We
distinguish three cases:
a- If 훿¯ ≤ 훿˜1, equivalently
퐹1
휋푚
1
≥ 11−푞 , the joint stability of the cartels increases with 푝2.
Full collusion in market 2 is thus optimal when jointly colluding, and Proposition 1
remains valid.
b- If 훿˜1 < 훿¯ < 훿˜2, equivalently
퐹1
휋푚
1
< 11−푞 <
퐹2
휋푚
2
, the joint stability of the cartels strictly
decreases in 푝2 for 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿¯[, is independent of 푝2 for 훿 = 훿¯, and strictly increases in 푝2 for
훿 ∈ ]훿¯, 훿˜2[. Partial collusion arises (for some values of 훿) in optimal joint collusion if the
condition in (2.12) holds for (푝1, 푝2, 훿) = (푝
푚
1 , 푝¯2, 훿¯) or, equivalently, if 퐹2 ≤
휋푚
1
−(1−푞)퐹1
1−2푞 .
If this inequality does not hold, full collusion is optimal, and Proposition 1 remains
valid. If it holds, we can show that two thresholds 훿12,푝 and 훿12,푓 exist which satisfy
훿˜1 < 훿12,푝 < 훿12,푓 < 훿˜2 such that the price pair (푝1(훿), 푝2(훿)) corresponding to optimal
collusion contains 푝1(훿) = 푝
푚
1 for all 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[ and 푝2(훿) as a function over ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[
such that: 푝2(훿) = 푐2 for all 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿12,푝] (no collusion in market 2), 푝2(훿) ∈ ]푝¯2, 푝
푚
2 [
strictly increasing over ]훿12,푝, 훿12,푓 [ (partial collusion in market 2) and 푝2(훿) = 푝
푚
2 for
all 훿 ∈ [훿12,푓 , 훿˜2[ (full collusion in market 2). Note that multimarket contact makes
collusion easier by inducing either partial or full collusion in market 2.
c- If 훿¯ ≥ 훿˜2, equivalently
퐹2
휋푚
2
≥ 11−푞 , the joint stability of the cartels strictly decreases
in 푝2 for all 훿 ∈ [훿˜1, 훿˜2[. We have two situations: either joint collusion is not incentive
compatible, and the ﬁrms compete in market 2, or collusion in market 2, partial at worst
and full at best, is incentive compatible together with full collusion in market 1.
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Consider now the situation under the US Leniency Program. For the ease of exposi-
tion, we illustrate how the possibility for partial collusion aﬀects our results by examining
the case where 훿˜1 < 훿¯ < 훿˜2 and 퐹2 ≤
휋푚
1
−(1−푞)퐹1
1−2푞 such that partial collusion may arise in
equilibrium. Suppose that 푅2 is small enough such that cartel 1 is robust to a detection
of cartel 2 over the entire interval. We can show that two thresholds 훿퐴푃12,푝 and 훿
퐴푃
12,푓 exist
which satisfy 훿˜1 ≤ 훿
퐴푃
12,푝 ≤ 훿
퐴푃
12,푓 ≤ 훿˜2 such that the price pair (푝
퐴푃
1 (훿), 푝
퐴푃
2 (훿)) corre-
sponding to optimal collusion contains 푝퐴푃1 (훿) = 푝
푚
1 for all 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[ and 푝
퐴푃
2 (훿) as a
function over ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[ such that: 푝
퐴푃
2 (훿) = 푐2 for all 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿
퐴푃
12,푝] (no collusion in market
2), 푝퐴푃2 (훿) ∈ ]푝¯2, 푝
푚
2 [ strictly increasing over ]훿
퐴푃
12,푝, 훿
퐴푃
12,푓 [ (partial collusion in market 2)
and 푝퐴푃2 (훿) = 푝
푚
2 for all 훿 ∈ [훿
퐴푃
12,푓 , 훿˜2[ (full collusion in market 2).
20 Furthermore, we
can establish that for all 푝2 ∈ ]푝¯2, 푝
푚
2 ], we have 푉12(푝1, 푝2, 훿) < 푉
퐴푃
12 (푝1, 푝2, 훿, 푅1, 푅2) if
and only if 푅1 > 퐹2. Using the former result, it can be shown that, if 푅1 > 퐹2, Amnesty
Plus is anticompetitive in the sense that 훿퐴푃12,푝 < 훿12,푝, 훿
퐴푃
12,푓 < 훿12,푓 and for all 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[
푝퐴푃2 (훿) ≥ 푝2(훿). If 푅1 < 퐹2, the reverse is true, and Amnesty Plus is procompetitive.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus on the ﬁrms’ incentives to form cartels.
The ﬁrms repeatedly interact in two markets of diﬀerent size and can use their multi-
market contact to sustain collusion. While US success stories suggest that Amnesty Plus
weakens cartel stability, our analysis shows that this is not correct in general.
We ﬁnd that Amnesty Plus may increase cartel deterrence provided that the pro-
collusive eﬀect is avoided. The central implication of our analysis is that an antitrust
authority can easily prevent this eﬀect by adhering to the following rule: Set the abso-
lute size of the ﬁne discount granted in one market equal or below the ﬁne the successful
Amnesty Plus applicant would have incurred in the other market. We argue that this
rule must be explicitly incorporated in the Amnesty Plus policy. One important rea-
son is that, on top of pursuing a social welfare objective, an antitrust authority cares
about performance. If performance is measured by the number of cartels dismantled,
the antitrust authority may want to oﬀer high discounts ex post, which may come with
undesirable eﬀects on deterrence ex ante.
20We cannot exclude that one or even two of these intervals are empty.
2.A. THE SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 55
2.A The Sequential Equilibrium
We show that (푆2→1, 푆2→1) can never be the best collusive equilibrium if 푞 is suﬃciently
small. We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1, we show under which conditions (푆2→1, 푆2→1)
is an equilibrium. In step 2, we demonstrate that, when (푆2→1, 푆2→1) is an equilibrium,
there is always another equilibrium that Pareto dominates the latter if 푞 is suﬃciently
small.
Step 1. The expected payoﬀ associated with (푆2→1, 푆2→1) is
푉2→1(훿) = 푉2(훿) + 푞
훿
1− 훿(1− 푞)
푉1(훿)
(푆2→1, 푆2→1) is an equilibrium if and only if cartel 1 is individually stable, i.e. 훿 ≥ 훿˜1,
and 푉2→1(훿) ≥ 2휋2. These two conditions hold if and only if 훿 ≥ max(훿˜1, 훿˜2→1) where
훿˜2→1 is such that 푉2→1(훿˜2→1) = 2휋2.
Step 2. Note ﬁrst that for 훿 ≥ 훿˜2, 푉1→2(훿) > 푉2→1(훿) if and only if 푉1(훿) >
푉2(훿) which always holds because of our assumptions 휋1 > 휋2 and
퐹2
휋2
> 퐹1
휋1
. Hence,
(푆1→2, 푆1→2) always strictly Pareto dominates (푆2→1, 푆2→1) for any 훿 in this range.
Consider now the interval [max(훿˜1, 훿˜2→1), 훿˜2[. The equilibrium (푆1, 푆1) strictly Pareto
dominates (푆2→1, 푆2→1) if and only if 푉1(훿) > 푉2→1(훿). We can write this inequality as
휋2 − 푞퐹2
휋1 − 푞퐹1
<
1− 훿
1− 훿(1− 푞)
As the right hand side (RHS) of the above inequality is decreasing in 훿, this condition
holds for all 훿 ∈ [max(훿˜1, 훿˜2→1), 훿˜2[ if and only if it holds for 훿 = 훿˜2, i.e.
(1− 푞)(휋2 − 푞퐹2)
2
(휋1 − 푞퐹1) (휋2(1− 2푞)− 푞퐹2)
< 1
As the LHS of the above inequality is continuous in 푞 and tends to 휋2
휋1
< 1 when 푞 →
0, there exists a threshold 푞˜ > 0 such that 푉1(훿) > 푉2→1(훿) for all 푞 ∈ ]0, 푞˜[ and
all 훿 ∈ [max(훿˜1, 훿˜2→1), 훿˜2[. Hence, if 푞 < 푞˜, (푆1, 푆1) always strictly Pareto dominates
(푆2→1, 푆2→1) for any 훿 in this range.
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2.B The Eﬀect of Multimarket Contact
Multimarket contact is procollusive, i.e. 훿˜12 < 훿˜2, if and only if
푉12(훿˜
−
2 ) > 2휋1 + 2휋2
which we rewrite as:
휋1 >
퐹1
퐹2
휋2 +
(
휋2
퐹2
− 푞
)
(휋2 + 푞퐹2)
1 + 푞 − 푞(1− 푞)퐹2
휋2
(2.13)
The latter holds only if the markets are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of proﬁtability. To
see this, we use our assumptions on the relative size of the ﬁnes and of the ﬁne-proﬁt
ratios to write
휋2
휋1
퐹1 < 퐹2 ≤ 퐹1
If 휋2 → 휋1, the above inequality implies that 퐹2 → 퐹1, and the RHS of the inequality
in (2.13) converges to
휋1 > 휋1 +
(
휋1
퐹1
− 푞
)
(휋1 + 푞퐹1)
1 + 푞 − 푞(1− 푞)퐹1
휋1
(2.14)
Since (1 + 푞) − 푞(1 − 푞)퐹1
휋1
> (1 + 푞) − 푞(1 + 푞)퐹1
휋1
= (1 + 푞)휋1−푞퐹1
휋1
and 휋1 − 푞퐹1 > 0,
the second expression in the RHS of the inequality in (2.14) is strictly positive. Hence,
the condition in (2.13) is not satisﬁed, and multimarket contact cannot help stabilize
an individually unstable cartel if markets 1 and 2 are too close in terms of proﬁtability.
In this case, multimarket contact is neutral, i.e. 훿˜12 = 훿˜2. However, if market 1 is
suﬃciently more proﬁtable than market 2, in the sense that the condition in (2.13)
holds, then multimarket contact is procollusive, i.e. 훿˜12 < 훿˜2.
This ﬁnding contrasts with the irrelevance result in Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
In our model, the latter takes the form of the special case 푞 = 0 in which multimarket
contact cannot aﬀect the ﬁrms’ ability to collude as the individual stability constraints
are identical for both markets. If the presence of an antitrust authority creates an asym-
metry between the markets in terms of collusion sustainability, due to e.g. heterogenous
detection probabilities or ﬁne-proﬁt ratios, then multimarket contact may ease collusion.
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2.C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 We proceed in three steps. In step 1, we determine the range
of discount factors for which (푆12, 푆12) is an equilibrium. In step 2, we show that the
sequential collusion equilibrium can never be the best collusive equilibrium of the game.
In step 3, we conclude.
Step 1. The value of joint collusion 푉12(훿) is given by:
푉12(훿) =
⎧⎨
⎩
휋1−푞퐹1
1−훿(1−푞)2
+ 휋2−푞퐹2
1−훿(1−푞)2
if 훿 < 훿˜1
휋1−푞퐹1
1−훿(1−푞) +
휋2−푞퐹2
1−훿(1−푞)2
if 훿˜1 ≤ 훿 < 훿˜2
휋1−푞퐹1
1−훿(1−푞) +
휋2−푞퐹2
1−훿(1−푞) if 훿˜2 ≤ 훿
(2.15)
If 훿 < 훿˜1, (푆12, 푆12) is not an equilibrium because 푉12(훿) ≤ 푉1(훿) + 푉2(훿) < 2휋1 + 2휋2.
If 훿 ≥ 훿˜2, (푆12, 푆12) is an equilibrium because 푉12(훿) = 푉1(훿) + 푉2(훿) ≥ 2휋1 + 2휋2.
Consider now 훿 ∈ [훿˜1, 훿˜2[. Note ﬁrst that
푉12(훿˜1) = 2휋1 +
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿˜1(1− 푞)2
< 2휋1 + 푉2(훿˜1) < 2휋1 + 2휋2
It follows from the continuity and strict monotonicity of 푉12(훿) that 푉12(훿) < 2휋1 + 2휋2
for any 훿 ∈ ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[ if 푉12(훿˜
−
2 ) ≤ 2휋1 + 2휋1. However, if 푉12(훿˜
−
2 ) > 2휋1 + 2휋1 then there
exists a threshold in the interval ]훿˜1, 훿˜2[ such that 푉12(훿) ≥ 2휋1 + 2휋2 for the discount
factor values above this threshold and 푉12(훿) < 2휋1 + 2휋2 for values below. Thus, there
always exists a (unique) threshold 훿˜12 ∈]훿˜1, 훿˜2] such that (푆12, 푆12) is an equilibrium for
훿 ≥ 훿˜12 and (푆12, 푆12) is not an equilibrium for 훿 < 훿˜12. If 푉12(훿˜
−
2 ) > 2휋1 + 2휋1 then
훿˜12 < 훿˜2. Otherwise 훿˜12 = 훿˜2.
Step 2. We show that whenever (푆1→2, 푆1→2) is an equilibrium, it is strictly dom-
inated by the equilibrium (푆12, 푆12) and thus cannot be the best collusive equilibrium.
We know that (푆1→2, 푆1→2) is an equilibrium if and only if 훿 ≥ 훿˜2. However, for 훿 ≥ 훿˜2,
the strategy pair (푆12, 푆12) constitutes an equilibrium as well and yields a collusive pay-
oﬀ of 푉12(훿) = 푉1(훿) + 푉2(훿) (Step 1). Since 푉1(훿) + 푉2(훿) > 푉1(훿) + 푞
훿
1−훿(1−푞)푉2(훿),
(푆1→2, 푆1→2) can never be the best collusive equilibrium. Notice that we exclude 훿 = 1
because (푆12, 푆12) and (푆1→2, 푆1→2) yield the same payoﬀ in that case, and both are
best collusive equilibria.
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Step 3. We conclude that:
- If 훿 < 훿˜1, neither (푆1, 푆1) nor (푆1→2, 푆1→2) nor (푆12, 푆12) is an equilibrium.
- If 훿˜1 ≤ 훿 < 훿˜12, the only collusive equilibrium is (푆1, 푆1) .
- If 훿 ≥ 훿˜12 then (푆12, 푆12) is an equilibrium and yields a higher payoﬀ than (푆1, 푆1) and
(푆1→2, 푆1→2), whenever it is an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider ﬁrst 훿 < 훿ˆ1(푅2) where cartel 1 is not robust to a
detection of cartel 2. The value of joint collusion is
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 +푅2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
Since 푅푘 ≤ 퐹푘, we know from (2.15) in Proof of Proposition 1 that 푉
퐴푃
12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) ≤
푉12(훿). Amnesty Plus cannot increase the value of joint collusion.
Consider now 훿 ≥ 훿ˆ1(푅2). The value of joint collusion is
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿 (1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿 (1− 푞)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
푉12(훿)
+
푞 (1− 푞) (푅1 − 퐹2)
2
(
1− 훿 (1− 푞)2
)
Amnesty Plus therefore increases the value of jointly colluding, i.e. 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) >
푉12(훿), if and only if 푅1 > 퐹2.
Proof of Proposition 2 The value of joint collusion 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) is strictly in-
creasing and right-continuous in 훿 over [훿˜1, 훿˜12[. Therefore, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for (푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) to be the best collusive equilibrium over a non-empty sub-
interval of [훿˜1, 훿˜12[ is that 푉
퐴푃
12 (훿˜
−
12, 푅1, 푅2) > 2휋1 + 2휋2. The Proof of Lemma 1 shows
that if 훿˜12 ≤ 훿ˆ1(푅2) then 푉
퐴푃
12 (훿˜
−
12, 푅1, 푅2) < 푉12(훿˜
−
12) ≤ 푉12(훿˜12) = 2휋1 + 2휋2. How-
ever, if 훿ˆ1(푅2) < 훿˜12 (equivalent to the condition in (2.9)) then 푉
퐴푃
12 (훿˜
−
12, 푅1, 푅2) =
푉12(훿˜
−
12) +
푞(1−푞)(푅1−퐹2)
2(1−훿˜12(1−푞)2)
> 2휋1 + 2휋2 if and only if the condition in (2.10) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3 Assume ﬁrst that 푅2 > 푅¯2, which implies that 훿ˆ1(푅2) > 훿˜12.
For 훿 ∈ [훿˜12, 훿ˆ1(푅2)[ cartel 1 is not robust and the Proof of Lemma 1 shows that
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜12, 푅1, 푅2) < 푉12(훿˜12) = 2휋1 + 2휋2. Hence, for any 훿 ∈ [훿˜12, 훿ˆ1(푅2)[ suﬃciently
2.C. PROOFS 59
close to 훿˜12, it must hold that 푉
퐴푃
12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) < 2휋1 + 2휋2 which implies that (푆12, 푆12)
is not an equilibrium and that (푆1, 푆1) is then the best collusive equilibrium.
Assume now that 푅2 ≤ 푅¯2, which implies that 훿ˆ1(푅2) ≤ 훿˜12. For any 훿 ∈ [훿˜12, 훿˜2[,
cartel 1 is then robust, and, consequently,
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿(1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
= 푉1(훿) +
2(휋2 − 푞퐹2) + 푞(1− 푞)(푅1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
(푆1, 푆1) is the best collusive equilibrium for a given 훿 if and only if either
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) < 2휋1 + 2휋2 (2.16)
or
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) < 푉1(훿) (2.17)
As we initially assumed that 푞 ≤ 휋22휋2+퐹2 which implies that the numerator of 푉
퐴푃
12 (훿,푅1, 푅2)−
푉1(훿) =
2(휋2−푞퐹2)+푞(1−푞)(푅1−퐹2)
2(1−훿(1−푞)2)
is strictly positive, and because 푉1(훿) is increasing in 훿,
푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) is also increasing in 훿 over [훿˜12, 훿˜2[. Hence, (푆1, 푆1) is the best collusive
equilibrium for a non-empty range of values of 훿 in [훿˜12, 훿˜2[ if and only if at least one of
the conditions (2.16) and (2.17) holds for 훿 = 훿˜12, i.e.
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜12, 푅1, 푅2) < max
(
2휋1 + 2휋2, 푉1
(
훿˜12
))
which amounts to
푉12(훿˜12) +
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− 훿(1− 푞)2)
< max
(
2휋1 + 2휋2, 푉1
(
훿˜12
))
Since 푉1(훿˜12) < 푉12(훿˜12) = 2휋1+2휋2 the latter condition can be rewritten as
푞(1−푞)(푅1−퐹2)
2(1−훿(1−푞)2)
<
0 which is the same as 푅1 < 퐹2.
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Proof of Proposition 4 Assume that ﬁne discounts under Amnesty Plus are such
that 푅퐿퐾 ≤ 퐹퐿 for all 퐾 ⊈푀 and 퐿 ⊆푀 ∖퐾.
For every 푖 ∈ {2, 3, ...,푚} , denote 푀푖 = {퐼 ⊆푀 such that ∣퐼∣ ≤ 푖}. Let us prove by
recursive induction on 푖 that, for any 푖 ∈ {2, 3, ...,푚}, 푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) ≤ 푉퐼 (훿) for all 퐼 ∈푀푖.
For 푖 = 2, the result is readily derived from our main analysis.
Consider now any 푖 ≥ 3 and assume that 푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) ≤ 푉퐼 (훿) for all 퐼 ∈ 푀푖−1. We
will show that the latter inequality also holds for any 퐼 ∈ 푀푖, which will complete the
proof. To do so it is suﬃcient to establish that the inequality is true for any subset 퐼 of
푖 markets, i.e. such that ∣퐼∣ = 푖. Consider such a subset.
푉퐼 (훿) is recursively deﬁned as:
푉퐼 (훿) = Π퐼 + (1− 푞)
푖 훿푉퐼 (훿) +
∑
퐽⊈퐼
퐽 ∕=∅
푞∣퐽 ∣ (1− 푞)푖−∣퐽 ∣ [−퐹퐽 + 푌 (퐼, 퐽)]− 푞
푖퐹퐼
where 푌 (퐼, 퐽) = 0 if 푅(퐼, 퐽) = ∅ and 푌 (퐼, 퐽) = 훿푉퐿(퐼,퐽) (훿) otherwise, which yields:
푉퐼 (훿) =
1
1− (1− 푞)푖 훿
⎡
⎢⎢⎣Π퐼 + ∑
퐽⊈퐼
퐽 ∕=∅
푞∣퐽 ∣ (1− 푞)푖−∣퐽 ∣ [−퐹퐽 + 푌 (퐼, 퐽)]− 푞
푖퐹퐼
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) is recursively deﬁned as:
푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) = Π퐼 + (1− 푞)
푖 훿푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) +
∑
퐽⊈퐼
퐽 ∕=∅
푞∣퐽 ∣ (1− 푞)푖−∣퐽 ∣
[
−퐹퐽 + 푌
퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽)
]
− 푞푖퐹퐼
where 푌 퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = 12(푅
퐼∖퐽
퐽 − 퐹
퐼∖퐽
퐽 ) if 푅
퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = ∅ and 푌 퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = 훿푉 퐴푃
퐿퐴푃 (퐼,퐽)
(훿)
otherwise, which yields
푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) =
1
1− (1− 푞)푖 훿
⎡
⎢⎢⎣Π퐼 + ∑
퐽⊈퐼
퐽 ∕=∅
푞∣퐽 ∣ (1− 푞)푖−∣퐽 ∣
[
−퐹퐽 + 푌
퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽)
]
− 푞푖퐹퐼
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Let us show that for any non-empty set 퐽 ⊈ 퐼, it holds that 푌 퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) ≤ 푌 (퐼, 퐽)
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which is a suﬃcient condition for the inequality 푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) ≤ 푉퐼 (훿) to hold.
Assume ﬁrst that 퐽 is such that 푅(퐼, 퐽) = ∅, i.e. for any 퐿 ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 , it holds that
푉퐿 (훿) < 2Π퐿. Since any 퐿 ⊆ 퐼 ∖ 퐽 belongs to 푀푖−1, we have: 푉
퐴푃
퐿 (훿) ≤ 푉퐿 (훿) <
2Π퐿 ≤ max(2Π퐿,
푅퐼∖퐽
퐽
훿
). Therefore, 푅퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = ∅. Thus, in this case, we get 푌 (퐼, 퐽) =
푌 퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = 0.
Assume now that 퐽 is such that 푅(퐼, 퐽) ∕= ∅. If 푅퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) = ∅ then 푌 퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) =
1
2(푅
퐼∖퐽
퐽 − 퐹
퐼∖퐽
퐽 ) ≤ 0 ≤ 훿푉퐿(퐼,퐽) (훿) = 푌 (퐼, 퐽) . If 푅
퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) ∕= ∅ then by deﬁnition of
퐿 (퐼, 퐽), we have 푉퐿퐴푃 (퐼,퐽) (훿) ≤ 푉퐿(퐼,퐽) (훿) and since 퐿
퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) belongs to 푀푖−1, we
also have 푉 퐴푃
퐿퐴푃 (퐼,퐽)
(훿) ≤ 푉퐿퐴푃 (퐼,퐽) (훿). Combining the latter two inequalities we obtain
푉 퐴푃
퐿퐴푃 (퐼,퐽)
(훿) ≤ 푉퐿(퐼,퐽) (훿), which implies that 푌
퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) ≤ 푌 (퐼, 퐽).Thus, we conclude
that 푌 퐴푃 (퐼, 퐽) ≤ 푌 (퐼, 퐽) holds for any non-empty set 퐽 ⊈ 퐼, which implies that
푉 퐴푃퐼 (훿) ≤ 푉퐼 (훿).
2.D The Procompetitive Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus
Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel 2, i.e. it makes (푆1→2, 푆1→2) the best collu-
sive equilibrium, for at least some values of 훿 in [훿˜2, 1[ if and only if it lowers the value
of jointly colluding such that either joint collusion is no more incentive compatible or is
Pareto dominated by sequential collusion. First, we show for which speciﬁc values of 푅1
and 푅2, the strategy pair (푆
퐴푃
12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) cannot be an equilibrium for at least some values
in the interval, and, second, we provide conditions under which (푆1→2, 푆1→2) Pareto
dominates (푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ).
The present discounted expected payoﬀ 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) each ﬁrm gets when they
both play the strategy 푆퐴푃12 is right-continuous and strictly increasing in 훿 over the
interval [훿˜2, 1[. Hence, (푆
퐴푃
12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ) is not an equilibrium for a non empty range of values
of 훿 in [훿˜2, 1[ if and only if
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) < 2휋1 + 2휋2 (2.18)
The value 푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) depends on the equilibrium payoﬀ in the reporting subgame
of stage 4. We therefore examine the condition in (2.18) for each of the four possible
scenarios that arise from the comparison of the individual stability threshold 훿˜2 and the
robustness thresholds.
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a- If 훿˜2 ≥ 훿ˆ1(푅2) and 훿˜2 ≥ 훿ˆ2(푅1), both cartels are individually stable and robust for
훿 = 훿˜2 and the value of joint collusion is equal to
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)
> 2휋1 + 2휋2
It is straightforward that in this case that the condition in (2.18) cannot hold. The ﬁne
reductions 푅1 and 푅2 are both too small to trigger reporting in the reporting subgame.
Amnesty Plus has no eﬀect and 푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) = 푉12(훿˜2).
b- If 훿˜2 ≥ 훿ˆ1(푅2) and 훿˜2 < 훿ˆ2(푅1), cartel 1 is individually stable and robust whereas
cartel 2 is stable but not robust for 훿 = 훿˜2. The value of joint collusion is equal to
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 − 퐹2)
2
(
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
)
We can thus rewrite the condition in (2.18) as
푅1 < 퐹2 +
2
(
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)
2
)
푞(1− 푞)
(
2휋1 + 2휋2 − 푉1(훿˜2)−
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
)
which suggests that, if Amnesty Plus can induce the reporting of cartel 2 in the reporting
subgame, the ﬁne reduction in market 1 must be suﬃciently low. Otherwise, the decrease
of the expected ﬁne would compensate the ﬁrms for the enhanced desistance, and the
procompetitive eﬀect cannot occur.
c- If 훿˜2 < 훿ˆ1(푅2) and 훿˜2 ≥ 훿ˆ2(푅1), cartel 2 is individually stable and robust whereas
cartel 1 is individually stable but not robust for 훿 = 훿˜2. The value of joint collusion is
equal to
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅2 − 퐹1)
2
(
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
)
The condition in (2.18) becomes
푅2 < 퐹1 +
2
(
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)
2
)
푞(1− 푞)
(
2휋1 −
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
)
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A similar argument as above applies, and the procompetitive eﬀect cannot occur.
d- If 훿˜2 < 훿ˆ1(푅2) and 훿˜2 < 훿ˆ2(푅1), both cartels are stable but not robust for 훿 = 훿˜2. The
value of joint collusion is
푉 퐴푃12 (훿˜2, 푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 +푅2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2)
2
(
1− 훿˜2(1− 푞)2
)
We rewrite the condition in (2.18) as
푅1 +푅2 < (퐹1 + 퐹2)
2− 푞
1− 푞
−
4훿˜2(1− 푞)(휋1 + 휋2)
푞
In this case, Amnesty Plus triggers the reporting in each possible reporting subgame of
stage 4. The ﬁne reductions must be suﬃciently low such that the expected ﬁnes do not
decrease too much.
We now provide suﬃcient conditions under which (푆1→2, 푆1→2) Pareto dominates
(푆퐴푃12 , 푆
퐴푃
12 ). Since 푉1→2(1
−) = 푉1(1
−) + 푉2(1
−) > 2휋1 + 2휋2 and 푉1→2(훿) is continuous
and increasing on [훿˜2, 1[, there exists a threshold 훿˜1→2 ∈ [훿˜2, 1[ such that for 훿 values in
this interval, we have 푉1→2(훿) ≥ 2휋1+2휋2 if and only if 훿 ≥ 훿˜1→2. This implies that the
comparison of 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) to 푉1→2(훿) is mainly relevant over the interval [훿˜1→2, 1[.
In what follows, we therefore concentrate on suﬃciently high values of 훿.
Consider the case where 훿ˆ1(푅2) > 1. Cartel 1 is then not robust for any value of 훿
in this interval. If, moreover, 훿ˆ2(푅1) > 1 the value of joint collusion for 훿 = 1
− is
푉 퐴푃12 (1
−, 푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− (1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
1− (1− 푞)2
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅1 +푅2 − 퐹1 − 퐹2)
2 (1− (1− 푞)2)
If, however, 훿ˆ2(푅1) ≤ 1 we have
푉 퐴푃12 (1
−, 푅1, 푅2) =
휋1 − 푞퐹1
1− (1− 푞)2
+
휋2 − 푞퐹2
푞
+
푞(1− 푞)(푅2 − 퐹1)
2 (1− (1− 푞)2)
In both cases it is true that 푉 퐴푃12 (1
−, 푅1, 푅2) < 푉1(1
−) + 푉2(1
−) = 푉1→2(1
−) which
implies that 푉 퐴푃12 (훿,푅1, 푅2) < 푉1→2(훿) for a non empty range of values of 훿 suﬃciently
close to 1. Hence, for this range of values, Amnesty Plus defers the formation of cartel
2.
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Consider now the case where 훿ˆ1(푅2) ≤ 1. Amnesty Plus defers the formation of
cartel 2 for values of 훿 suﬃciently close to 1 if
휋2 − 푞퐹2
푞
< 푅1 < 퐹2 + 2
휋2 − 푞퐹2
푞(1− 푞)
(
1− (1− 푞)2
푞
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
The LHS ensures that cartel 2 is not robust, i.e. 훿ˆ2(푅1) > 1, and the RHS implies that
푉 퐴푃12 (1
−, 푅1, 푅2) < 푉1(1
−) + 푉2(1
−) = 푉1→2(1
−) given that 훿ˆ1(푅2) ≤ 1 and 훿ˆ2(푅1) > 1.
Chapter 3
Why Eﬀort May Increase With
Ability: Complementarity of
Antitrust Enforcement and Policy
Instruments
joint with Yassine Lefouili
3.1 Introduction
There are two main points to this chapter. First, we characterize the optimal cartel
detection eﬀort of an antitrust authority.1 Second, we show that this eﬀort may increase
with the use of a policy instrument that assists cartel deterrence.
Recent years have seen several important changes in the antitrust law of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) with respect to cartels, all with the objective of improving deterrence
of cartel activities in the Community and some with a view to alleviating lengthy ad-
ministrative procedures.2 There have been three policy modiﬁcations with particularly
1Throughout the chapter, we use detection eﬀort, detection probability and rate of law enforcement
interchangeably.
2The time span between the starting date of an investigation, i.e. the date of the dawn raid, and
the decision has been e.g. more than ﬁve years for the copper ﬁttings case, around four years for the
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far-reaching implications for the eﬀectiveness of the European antitrust policy as well as
for the workload of the competent division in the European Commission (EC), namely
the adoption of a settlement procedure, the introduction of damages actions and the
2002 reform of the leniency program.
In 2008, the EC has introduced a settlement procedure for cartels.3 Settlements are
an option for companies which prefer to admit liability, bring an end to the procedure
and obtain a 10% reduction in the ﬁne, rather than explore every procedural option
available. They speed up cartel investigations and thereby allow the EC to redirect
resources, time and energy previously employed in the long process leading to a decision
towards the detection of cartels.
Also in 2008, the EC adopted a white paper on the issue of using customer damages
as a penalty.4 Despite the great eﬀort of the EC to promote an eﬀective mechanism for
the private enforcement of European competition law, private actions for damages have
remained relatively rare. However, if a damage actions system can be made eﬀective and
victims of competition law infringement enforce their right for compensation, the level
of ﬁnes may dramatically rise and thereby increase deterrence substantially.
The EU Leniency Program, especially after its revision in 2002, has been very suc-
cessful in uncovering large international cartels.5 The revised program makes it easier
and ﬁnancially more attractive for ﬁrms to apply. An eﬀective leniency program pro-
duces cartel cases where the applicant delivers information which guides the authority’s
investigations and thus reduces time and resources spent on establishing the case. More-
over, if properly designed, leniency programs make collusion more diﬃcult and therefore
increase deterrence.6
This chapter examines the eﬀect of policy instruments, such as settlement procedures,
private actions and leniency programs, on the optimal eﬀort the antitrust authority pro-
vides to detect cartels. We measure this detection eﬀort by the probability of launching
an investigation in a particular industry. The policy instrument and the detection eﬀort
Netherlands bitumen case and more than three years for the synthetic rubber case (Motta, 2007).
3Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004,
as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, Oﬃcial Journal L 171, 1.7.2008, p.3−5.
4White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008.
5Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002/C 45/03,
19 February 2002.
6See in particular Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007), Spagnolo (2004).
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are complements if the introduction of a new - or the modiﬁcation of an already existing -
instrument, which assists deterrence, is optimally accompanied by a higher enforcement
rate. They are substitutes if the authority ﬁnds it optimal to lower the enforcement
rate when it uses the instrument. The issue of complementarity and substitutability
is important for antitrust policy in practice. Guidelines are permanently revised, new
legal frameworks are promoted and established ones adapted. The correct redirection of
additionally available resources is crucial for the eﬀectiveness of antitrust enforcement
and for society as a whole.
A major part of the economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the
trade-oﬀ between probability and severity of punishment. In his seminal paper, Becker
(1968) suggests that the detection probability and ﬁnes are substitutes. Both the size
of ﬁnes and the rate of investigations positively aﬀect deterrence, but, whereas the
former are costless transfers, investigations are costly. Hence, to reach a given level of
crime deterrence, ﬁnes should be in- and the detection probability decreased. It would
seem intuitive that, when more deterrence is reached through the mere use of a policy
instrument, less resources should be spent on detection. It is however not clear a priori
in which direction the optimal level of detection changes if the latter is endogenous.
Our main ﬁnding is that the eﬀect of the policy instrument on the optimal detection
eﬀort depends on the speciﬁc enforcement tool used. Complementarity occurs if the
use of the policy instrument increases the marginal beneﬁt of launching investigations.
We ﬁnd this to be the case for instruments that aﬀect the level of ﬁnes for convicted
cartel members such as settlement procedures and damages actions. If, however, the
instrument is an eﬀective leniency program, the optimal rate of law enforcement may
increase as well as decrease.
In a recent paper, Chang and Harrington (2008) analyze the impact of a leniency pro-
gram on the steady-state cartel rate when the antitrust authority’s enforcement policy
is endogenous. Their striking ﬁnding is that the leniency program may raise the cartel
rate. To get this result, the authors make the assumption that the authority disposes of
limited resources which it uses for handling leniency and non-leniency cases. If part of
the resources are used for leniency cases, then fewer resources are available for eﬀectively
prosecuting non-leniency cases. In response to having a leniency policy, the antitrust au-
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thority adjusts its optimal enforcement policy downwards and thus prosecutes a smaller
fraction of cartels discovered outside the leniency program. Hence, in those industries
where the leniency program cannot deter cartel formation, weaker cartel enforcement
increases the life span of the cartels. There are three main diﬀerences between our study
and Chang and Harrington (2008). First, in their model, while the antitrust authority
can choose the fraction of non-leniency cases it pursues, the probability of detecting a
cartel is ﬁxed. We however examine whether the authority should increase or decrease
this detection probability with the introduction of a leniency program. Second, while
Chang and Harrington (2008) consider an authority that maximizes the mass of cartels
successfully prosecuted, we examine an authority that maximizes the mass of cartels de-
terred. Third, while the authors are only concerned with leniency programs, we analyze
the authority’s optimal response to diﬀerent instruments.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the basic
model without monitoring. In section 3.3, we introduce two diﬀerent policy instruments
and examine whether we have complementarity or substitutability. We introduce mon-
itoring in section 3.4. Finally, section 3.5 brieﬂy concludes. All proofs can be found in
the appendix.
3.2 Basic Model
3.2.1 Set-up
Consider an economy that consists of a continuum of industries the mass of which is
constant over time. In each industry, there are 푛 ﬁrms that discount future payoﬀs
by a common discount factor 훿. Inter-industry heterogeneity exists with respect to
훿 which is distributed across industries with a strictly increasing 퐹 (훿) over [0, 1].7 We
consider an inﬁnitely repeated game where, in each period, the ﬁrms can choose to collude
before interacting on the product market. Communication is necessary for collusion and
generates hard evidence which makes it possible to establish the antitrust oﬀense. There
is no intra-industry heterogeneity, and the ﬁrms in the same industry either all collude
7Inter-industry heterogeneity with respect to 훿 implies that the industries diﬀer only in their discount
factors and not in size or collusive proﬁts. Whereas 훿 captures various sources of heterogeneity, the
reverse assumption, namely that industries diﬀer only in size or proﬁts, seems more restrictive to us.
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or compete. At the time the ﬁrms decide whether to enter a collusive agreement, they
observe the Antitrust Authority’s (AA) enforcement policy which is summarized by the
probability of detection and, if applicable, other policy instruments such as ﬁnes and
self-reporting beneﬁts.
In each period, there is a probability 푞 ∈ [0, 1], invariant across time and industries,
with which the AA launches an investigation. This probability represents the AA’s
detection eﬀort. Once an investigation is opened, the probability to convict the cartel is
1. Each convicted ﬁrm must pay a strictly positive ﬁne 푓 .
To keep the analysis simple, we suppose that the evidence of collusion lasts for one
period which implies that a cartel cannot be prosecuted for its past activity. Thus, a
ﬁrm which has deviated from a collusive agreement is held liable for its cartel behavior
and can be ﬁned until the end of the period in which the deviation occurred. Following a
cartel conviction, we assume that the AA does not monitor the industry and thus, each
period, the ﬁrms may return back to collusion. We relax this ‘no monitoring’ assumption
further in the analysis.
For each detection probability 푞, an increasing threshold function 훿˜(푞) exists. Col-
lusion in a particular industry is sustainable if and only if 훿 ≥ 훿˜(푞). The proportion of
industries which are collusive at a speciﬁc detection probability 푞 is then 1−퐹 (훿˜(푞)). We
denote this proportion the collusion rate of the economy and assume that 푞 → 퐹 (훿˜(푞))
is concave. Given the ‘no monitoring’ assumption, the collusion rate is stationary and
equal to 1− 퐹 (훿˜(푞)) each period.
The objective of the AA is to maximize the present discounted sum of welfare gen-
erated each period over all industries. A competitive industry generates a per-period
welfare of 푊 . Cartels are homogenous, and thus, each collusive industry generates the
same per-period deadweight loss 퐷. 푊−퐷 is then the per-period welfare generated by a
collusive industry, and [1−퐹 (훿˜(푞))]퐷 is the per-period social cost of collusion. To guar-
antee detection and conviction at a probability 푞 each period, the AA incurs a present
discounted cost of 퐶(푞, 훿푠). We assume that 퐶(0, 훿푠) = 0,
∂
∂푞
퐶(0, 훿푠) = 0,
∂
∂푞
퐶(푞, 훿푠) > 0
and ∂
2
∂푞2
퐶(푞, 훿푠) ≥ 0. 훿푠 is the AA’s discount factor.
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3.2.2 Timing
We use the timing of Chen and Rey (2007). In each period, the time structure of the
game is as follows:
Stage 0 : Each ﬁrm decides whether to enter a collusive agreement. If at least one
ﬁrm chooses not to collude, competition takes place in this particular industry, and
the game ends for that period. If all the ﬁrms in an industry choose to collude,
they communicate and leave some hard evidence.
Stage 1 : Each ﬁrm decides whether to deviate from the collusive agreement. Their
rivals do not observe this decision until the end of the period.
Stage 2 : Each cartel formed in stage 0 is detected with probability 푞 in which case
all ﬁrms pay 푓 , and the game ends for that period.
3.2.3 Antitrust Authority
Optimal Law Enforcement
The AA maximizes the present discounted sum of welfare generated each period over all
industries:
푈(푞) =
푊
1− 훿푠
−
퐷
(
1− 퐹
(
훿˜(푞)
))
1− 훿푠
− 퐶(푞, 훿푠)
Since 푈(푞) is strictly concave in 푞, we have a unique maximizing solution 푞∗ characterized
by the First Order Condition:8
∂
∂푞
푆(푞∗, 훿푠) =
∂
∂푞
퐶(푞∗, 훿푠)
where 푆(푞, 훿푠) = −
퐷(1−퐹 (훿˜(푞)))
1−훿푠
is the present discounted sum of per-period welfare losses
due to collusion. The above equation implies that the optimal rate of law enforcement 푞∗
equalizes marginal beneﬁts in terms of cartel deterrence and marginal costs of conducting
investigations.
8We assume that the unique solution to the AA’s maximization program is interior.
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Policy Instrument
To better combat collusion, the AA decides an exogenous change in the legal framework
푅 > 0. 푅 represents the modiﬁcation or the introduction of a policy instrument. We
assume that this modiﬁcation is costless, or equivalently, that its cost is independent of
푞. In a particular industry, collusion is now sustainable if and only if 훿 ≥ 훿˜(푞,푅) where
훿˜(푞,푅) increases in 푅 and 훿˜(푞, 0) = 훿˜(푞). 푅 aﬀects the AA’s objective and, thereby, the
optimal detection probability 푞∗(푅) which is now characterized by
∂
∂푞
푆(푞∗, 푅, 훿푠) =
∂
∂푞
퐶(푞∗, 훿푠)
where 푆(푞,푅, 훿푠) = −
퐷(1−퐹 (훿˜(푞,푅)))
1−훿푠
.
Lemma 2 (a) If ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
푆(푞,푅, 훿푠) > 0, then 푞
∗(푅) increases with 푅; the policy instru-
ment 푅 and the optimal law enforcement are complements.
(b) If ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
푆(푞,푅, 훿푠) < 0, then 푞
∗(푅) decreases with 푅; the policy instrument 푅 and
the optimal law enforcement are substitutes.
Proof Follows directly from the diﬀerentiation of both sides of the optimality condition
with respect to 푅.
Lemma 2 implies that, if the policy instrument raises the marginal beneﬁt of 푞 in
terms of social loss reduction, it is optimal to increase 푞 until the marginal beneﬁt equals
the marginal cost. Using Lemma 2 we get the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Without monitoring, the impact of the policy instrument 푅 on the op-
timal detection probability 푞∗(푅) solely depends on whether 푅 increases or decreases the
marginal eﬃciency of 푞 in deterring collusion.
(a) If ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
퐹 (훿˜(푞,푅)) > 0, then 푞∗(푅) increases with 푅; the policy instrument 푅 and
the optimal law enforcement are complements.
(b) If ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
퐹 (훿˜(푞,푅)) < 0, then 푞∗(푅) decreases with 푅; the policy instrument 푅 and
the optimal law enforcement are substitutes.
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Proof Follows directly from Lemma 2.
Proposition 5 suggests that, if, by means of the policy instrument, an additional
investigation can prevent collusion more eﬀectively than before, the AA should optimally
tighten its enforcement policy and spend more resources on detection. If, however,
the instrument decreases the marginal eﬃciency of 푞, less enforcement is optimal. A
priori, there is no reason why the latter rather than the former scenario should occur.
Whether we have complementarity or substitutability depends on the nature of the policy
instrument. Proposition 5 implies:
Corollary 2 If 퐹 (.) is weakly convex, at least over [훿˜(0, 0), 1], a suﬃcient condition for
the policy instrument and the optimal law enforcement to be complements is ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅) >
0.
Proof See Appendix 3.A.
3.2.4 Cartel Stability
Consider a particular industry with 푛 ≥ 2 ﬁrms. If all ﬁrms collude, each ﬁrm earns a
per-period cartel proﬁt equal to 휋 > 0 minus the expected ﬁne 푞푓 . If all ﬁrms compete,
they make zero proﬁts. If one ﬁrm unilaterally deviates from the cartel while the others
continue to collude, the deviating ﬁrm earns the whole short-term cartel proﬁt 푛휋 alone.
The ﬁrms that stick to the agreement receive zero. The ﬁrms use grim trigger strategies
and thus punish a deviation by reversion to competition. The punishment starts the
period following the deviation and lasts forever after. After a cartel conviction, the AA
does not monitor the industry, and the ﬁrms simply return back to collusion in the next
period. The expected discounted value 푉 each ﬁrm gets from collusion is then
푉 =
휋 − 푞푓
1− 훿
The cartel is sustainable only if the expected discounted value is as least as big as the
gain from a unilateral deviation:
푉 ≥ 푛휋 − 푞푓
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This incentive constraint deﬁnes the threshold function 훿˜(푞, 푓) such that the cartel is
stable if and only if
훿 ≥
(푛− 1)휋
푛휋 − 푞푓
≡ 훿˜(푞, 푓)
A ﬁrm has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the collusive equilibrium if 훿 ≥ 훿˜(푞, 푓)
and thus, collusion is sustainable. Below this threshold, the ﬁrms anticipate that no one
would stick to the agreement, and therefore they do not form the cartel in the ﬁrst
place. The stability threshold 훿˜(푞, 푓) increases in 푞 and 푓 . Intuitively, the higher the
probability of conviction and the higher the ﬁne, the more ﬁrms have to value future
ﬂows of collusive proﬁts, and thus, the higher the 훿 needed to sustain the cartel. For
collusion to be a problem in at least some of the industries, we need 훿˜(푞, 푓) < 1→ 푓
휋
< 1
푞
which implies that the ﬁne-proﬁt ratio must be suﬃciently low.
3.3 The Eﬀect of a Policy Instrument
Let us now examine the eﬀect of a policy instrument 푅 on the AA’s optimal detection
eﬀort. Proposition 6 states a suﬃcient condition for 푅 and 푞∗(푅) to be complements.
Proposition 6 Assume that 훿˜(푞,푅) depends on 푞 and 푅 only through the interaction
term 푞푅, i.e. there exists a function 푔 such that 훿˜(푞,푅) = 푔(푞푅). If 푥 −→ 푥푔′(푥) is
increasing (over the relevant range), i.e. 푔 is convex or moderately concave, then 푞∗(푅)
is increasing in 푅, and the optimal detection probability and the policy instrument are
complements.
Proof See Appendix 3.A.
Proposition 6 suggests that, if the policy instrument enters the collusion rate only
through an interaction term with 푞, we have complementarity. Let us illustrate this
result by using two diﬀerent policy instruments. First, we consider an increase in the
level of ﬁnes. Second, we use a leniency program. We ease the exposition by examining
the special case in which 훿 is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], i.e. 퐹 (훿) = 훿, such that
the collusion rate is 1− 훿˜(푞,푅).
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3.3.1 Increase in the Level of Fines
Suppose that 푅 stands for an increase in 푓 . It is easy to see from the cartel stability
condition that the ﬁne parameter 푓 enters the collusion rate only through the expected
ﬁne, and thus only through the interaction with 푞. In this case, Proposition 6 predicts
complementarity between the ﬁne increase and the detection eﬀort. This signiﬁes that
the cross derivative in Proposition 5 must be positive:
∂2
∂푞∂푓
(
(푛− 1)휋
푛휋 − 푞푓
)
> 0
It is easy to check that this condition always holds. Hence, higher ﬁnes should optimally
go hand in hand with higher detection eﬀorts and thus, more resources should be spent
on the detection of cartels.
Note that in our setting, ﬁnes are not costly. The complementarity result may not
or only partly arise if we take into account that the antitrust authority may commit
legal errors by e.g. mistakenly taking a research joint venture for a cartel. If such errors
may happen, ﬁrms may not be willing to form socially desirable research collaborations
if the expected ﬁnes are high enough. Hence, ﬁnes may be socially costly, and this cost
increases with the probability of detection and the level of ﬁnes. In this case, we may
still see complementarity if expected ﬁnes are suﬃciently low. Substitutability may then
however arise for high levels of expected ﬁnes.
Another situation in which complementarity between detection eﬀorts and ﬁne in-
creases may not hold occurs if we change the AA’s objective. If we follow Harrington
(2010), who suggests that the objective of an agency is to maximize the number of cartels
prosecuted rather than minimizing the cartels formed, setting 푞 = 1, even at zero cost,
would never be optimal. In this case, the detection eﬀort and the ﬁne increase may be
substitutes, especially if the deterrent eﬀect of the ﬁnes is already strong.
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3.3.2 Leniency Program
Consider a leniency program that helps to combat collusion.9 A leniency program is
eﬀective if a ﬁrm which unilaterally deviates also immediately reports the cartel. For
this to be the case, the ﬁrst ﬁrm that reports the cartel must be eligible for a reduced ﬁne
(1−훼)푓 smaller than the expected ﬁne without reporting 푞푓 , i.e. 훼 ∈]1−푞, 1]. Then, the
possibility to beneﬁt from leniency tightens the incentive constraint and makes collusion
more diﬃcult:
푉 ≥ 푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓
The above condition implies that a ﬁrm can apply for leniency in each period irrespective
of whether the AA has convicted the cartel previously. Hence, leniency is equally oﬀered
to repeated oﬀenders.10 Collusion is sustainable if and only if
훿 ≥
(푛− 1)휋 − (1− 훼− 푞)푓
푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓
≡ 훿˜(푞, 훼)
From the above expression, we can see that the policy instrument 훼 does not enter
the cartel stability condition through the interaction with 푞. Hence, we cannot use
Proposition 6 to determine the relationship between 푞∗(훼) and 훼. We therefore check
whether the cross derivative in Proposition 5 is positive:
∂2
∂푞∂훼
(
(푛− 1)휋 − (1− 훼− 푞)푓
푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓
)
> 0
−푓2
(푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓)2
> 0
It is easy to see that this inequality cannot hold which suggests that the leniency program
and the optimal detection probability are substitutes. Hence, the leniency program
should optimally be accompanied by lower detection eﬀorts.
9The ﬁrms may use the leniency program to their advantage and play alternative collusive strategies
which reduce expected ﬁnes and facilitate collusion (see e.g. Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007)
and Motta and Polo (2003)). While we acknowledge that leniency programs may, under certain cir-
cumstances, encourage collusion, we focus here on leniency programs which are beneﬁcial to antitrust
enforcement.
10Under the 2002 EU Leniency Program, a repeated oﬀender can apply for leniency. This is consistent
with Chen and Rey (2007) who show that ruling out leniency for repeated oﬀenders may weaken antitrust
enforcement.
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3.3.3 Discussion
Our results suggest that whether we have complementarity or substitutability depends
on the nature of the policy instrument. Two policy instruments, even though they both
have a positive eﬀect on cartel deterrence, can have diametrically opposed eﬀects on the
optimal level of detection eﬀorts. Intuitively, this diﬀerence is due to the fact that the
ﬁne increase inﬂuences the ﬁrms’ incentives to form a cartel only in combination with the
detection probability (see Proposition 6). A ﬁne increase strengthens the impact of the
detection eﬀort and vice-versa. This is however not the case with the leniency program.
A lower ﬁne for the ﬁrst reporting ﬁrm makes a deviation more attractive independently
of the probability of detection and therefore makes the detection eﬀort marginally less
eﬀective. The AA’s optimal response to a more eﬀective leniency program is thus to
decrease its eﬀort.
3.4 Extended Model With Monitoring
We now relax the ‘no monitoring’ hypothesis and assume that, after a cartel conviction,
the AA can forever monitor the previously collusive industry in which case the ﬁrms
compete and never return back to collusion. Monitoring happens with probability 1−푘,
and thus, the ﬁrms return to collusion with probability 0 ≤ 푘 < 1 each period. Note
that the policy instrument now aﬀects the cost that guarantees a speciﬁc per-period
detection probability 푞. This is because, with monitoring, the future collusive mass
of industries, which determines this cost, is the current collusive mass which has not
been detected plus the current collusive mass which has been detected but returns back
to collusion with probability 푘. Since 푅 determines the current collusive mass via the
collusion rate and therefore aﬀects the future collusive mass of industries, it enters the
total expected discounted detection cost 퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘).
11 The expected collusion rate is
non stationary and mechanically decreases with 푡. At time 푡 = 0, 1, . . ., it is equal to
(1− 푞 + 푞푘)푡[1− 퐹 (훿˜(푞,푅))].
11We develop the expression of 퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) with a constant unit cost of an investigation in Appendix
3.B for the special case 푘 = 0.
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3.4.1 Antitrust Authority
After the introduction of the policy instrument, the optimality condition is deﬁned by
∂
∂푞
푆(푞∗, 푅, 훿푠, 푘) =
∂
∂푞
퐶(푞∗, 푅, 훿푠, 푘)
This condition diﬀers from the one under the ‘no monitoring’ assumption in two ways.
First, as just discussed, the cost function explicitly depends on the policy instrument
푅. Second, the denominator of expression 푆(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) contains 푞, i.e. 푆(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) =
−퐷(1−퐹 (훿(푞,푘,푅)))1−훿푠(1−푞(1−푘)) .
Lemma 3 (a) If ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
푆(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘)−
∂2
∂푞∂푅
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) > 0, then 푞
∗(푅) increases with
푅; the policy instrument 푅 and the optimal law enforcement are complements.
(b) If ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
푆(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) −
∂2
∂푞∂푅
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) < 0, then 푞
∗(푅) decreases with 푅; the
policy instrument 푅 and the optimal law enforcement are substitutes.
Proof Follows directly from the diﬀerentiation of both sides of the optimality condition
with respect to 푅.
From Lemma 3 we know that, if ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) ≤ 0, the condition in Lemma 2
is still suﬃcient for complementarity but not for substitutability. Therefore, under the
plausible assumption that the cross derivative of the cost function is weakly negative, we
have complementarity between the policy instrument 푅 and the optimal detection eﬀort
푞∗(푅) if the cross derivative of the beneﬁt in terms of social loss reduction is positive.
Proposition 7 gives the new complementarity condition:
Proposition 7 When ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) ≤ 0, the policy instrument 푅 and the optimal
law enforcement are complements, i.e. 푞∗(푅) increases with 푅, if
훿푠(1− 푘)
∂
∂푅
퐹
(
훿˜(푞, 푘, 푅)
)
− (1− 훿푠 (1− 푞(1− 푘)))
∂2
∂푞∂푅
퐹
(
훿˜(푞, 푘, 푅)
)
< 0
Proof Follows directly from Lemma 2 and 3.
Proposition 7 suggests that the eﬀect of 푅 on the optimal rate of detection is com-
posed of two, potentially opposed, eﬀects. First, there is a direct eﬀect of 푅 on 훿˜(푞, 푘, 푅)
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which implies that the existence of the instrument prevents more ﬁrms from entering col-
lusive agreements. This is because the instrument tightens a ﬁrm’s incentive constraint
and makes cheating more attractive. Second, an indirect eﬀect exists through the eﬀect
on the marginal eﬃciency of 푞. The policy instrument can make a single investigation
more or less eﬀective and thus, also enters the incentive constraints through its eﬀect
on 푞. Complementarity occurs if the indirect eﬀect is positive and prevails. The reason
is straightforward: If 푅 raises the eﬀectiveness of 푞 in deterring collusion substantially
more than it directly acts on deterrence, it is optimal to increase the detection probabil-
ity. If, however, either the indirect eﬀect is negative or the direct eﬀect of 푅 dominates
the indirect positive eﬀect, it is the size of the cross derivative of the cost function that
determines whether the detection eﬀort and the policy instrument are complements or
substitutes. If the negative eﬀect of 푅 on the marginal cost of 푞 is strong enough, we
have complementarity. If the eﬀect is rather weak, we have substitutes, and it is optimal
to reduce costly investigations. Hence, whether we have complements or substitutes
depends, ﬁrst, on the sign of the indirect eﬀect, second, if the latter is positive, on the
relative strength of the two eﬀects, and third, on the size of the reduction in the marginal
cost of 푞.
3.4.2 Cartel Stability
The expected discounted value from collusion is
푉 = 푞(휋 − 푓 + 푘훿푉 ) + (1− 푞)(휋 + 훿푉 )
푉 =
휋 − 푞푓
1− 훿 (1− 푞(1− 푘))
The deviation payoﬀ is the same as in the case without monitoring, and the cartel is
sustainable only if no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate, i.e.
푉 ≥ 푛휋 − 푞푓
훿 ≥
(푛− 1)휋
(1− 푞(1− 푘)) (푛휋 − 푞푓)
≡ 훿˜(푞, 푘, 푓)
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For collusion to be a problem, i.e. 훿˜(푞, 푘, 푓) < 1, the ﬁne-proﬁt ratio must be suﬃciently
low such that 푓
휋
< 1−푛푞(1−푘)
푞(1−푞(1−푘)) .
3.4.3 Policy Instrument
Let us again illustrate our theoretical considerations by using the increase in the level
of ﬁnes and the leniency program as policy instruments. We focus on the case where
∂2
∂푞∂푅
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) ≤ 0. As above, we assume that 훿 is uniformly distributed over [0, 1],
i.e. 퐹 (훿) = 훿, such that the collusion rate is 1− 훿˜(푞, 푘, 푅).
Increase in the Level of Fines
As 푓 enters the cartel stability condition only through the expected ﬁnes and thus,
through the interaction with 푞, Proposition 6 predicts that the optimal detection eﬀort
and the ﬁne increase are complements. We can easily check this by computing the simple
and the cross derivatives of 훿˜(푞, 푘, 푓) with respect to 푓 and with respect to 푞 and 푓 . The
complementarity condition writes as
훿푠푞(1− 푘) (1− 푞(1− 푘)) (푛휋 − 푞푓)− (1− 훿푠 (1− 푞(1− 푘)))
(
푛휋 + 푞푓 − 2푞2푓(1− 푘)
)
< 0
푛휋 + 푞푓 − 2푞2푓(1− 푘)
(1− 푞(1− 푘)) (푞(1− 푘)(푛휋 − 푞푓) + 푛휋 + 푞푓 − 2푞2푓(1− 푘))
> 훿푠
The latter condition holds for any 훿푠 ≤ 1. If
∂2
∂푞∂푅
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠, 푘) ≤ 0, we have thus the
same result as in the case without monitoring: The ﬁne increase and the detection eﬀort
are complements.
Leniency Program
The possibility to apply for leniency aﬀects the ﬁrm’s deviation payoﬀ. Collusion is now
sustainable only if
푉 ≥ 푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓
훿 ≥
(푛− 1)휋 − (1− 푞 − 훼)푓
(1− 푞(1− 푘)) (푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓)
≡ 훿˜(푞, 푘, 훼)
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Proposition 6 does not apply because 훼 does not enter the cartel stability condition
through the interaction with 푞. Hence, we have to compute the derivatives of 훿˜(푞, 푘, 훼)
with respect to 훼 and with respect 푞 and 훼. The former gives us
∂
∂훼
훿˜(푞, 푘, 훼) =
푓(휋 − 푞푓)
(1− 푞(1− 푘)) (푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓)2
This expression is positive because, under the assumption that 푓
휋
< 1−푛푞(1−푘)
푞(1−푞(1−푘)) , we know
that 1− 푞 푓
휋
> 0. This implies that the leniency program has a positive direct eﬀect on
deterrence by increasing the threshold above which collusion is proﬁtable. For the cross
derivative we get
∂2
∂푞∂훼
훿˜(푞, 푘, 훼) =
푓 (휋(1− 푘)− 푓)
(1− 푞(1− 푘))2 (푛휋 − (1− 훼)푓)2
Whereas the denominator is positive, the numerator is negative when 푓
휋
> 1 − 푘 and
positive when 푓
휋
< 1 − 푘. If the numerator is negative, whether we have substitutes or
complements solely depends on the strength of the negative eﬀect of 훼 on the marginal
cost of 푞. If the numerator is positive, we can again have both complementarity and
substitutability. The complementarity condition then writes
훿푠(1− 푘) (1− 푞(1− 푘)) (휋 − 푞푓)− (1− 훿푠(1− 푞(1− 푘))) (휋(1− 푘)− 푓) < 0
휋(1− 푘)− 푓
(1− 푞(1− 푘)) (2휋(1− 푘)− 푓 (1 + 푞(1− 푘)))
> 훿푠
The latter condition holds for any 훿푠 ≤ 1 if
푓
휋
< 2푞(1−푘)−1
푞2(1−푘)
which is necessarily true if
푞 ≥ 12(1−푘) . In this case, the leniency program and the optimal law enforcement are
complements. If 푞 < 12(1−푘) , we have still complementarity for
푓
휋
small enough. For a
suﬃciently large 푓
휋
and 훿푠 it depends on the size of the marginal cost eﬀect whether we
have substitutes or complements.
3.4.4 Discussion
Proposition 6 applies also if we relax the ‘no monitoring assumption’. The ﬁne increase
and the optimal rate of law enforcement are again complements. For the leniency pro-
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gram, whereas we had substitutability without monitoring, complementarity can now
occur. A possible explanation for this outcome is that the higher reporting beneﬁts
under the leniency program not only reduce the current number of cartelizing ﬁrms and
thus the need for detection but also the future fraction of ﬁrms that will be able to return
to collusion. By reducing the future collusive mass, the leniency program can make the
detection eﬀort marginally more eﬀective.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter characterizes the cartel detection eﬀort that minimizes the collusion rate
and shows that this eﬀort may increase when the antitrust authority uses a policy in-
strument that itself has a positive eﬀect on deterrence.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the eﬀect on the optimal detection eﬀort and, with it,
the socially desired redirection of resources depend on the speciﬁc policy instrument.
Complementarity occurs if the use of a particular instrument increases the marginal
beneﬁt of conducting investigations such that it is optimal to increase detection. We
ﬁnd this to be the case for instruments that aﬀect the level of ﬁnes for convicted cartel
members. If, however, the instrument an eﬀective leniency program, the optimal rate of
law enforcement decreases. This substitutability result is sensible to our ‘no monitoring’
hypothesis. Complementarity between the detection eﬀort and the leniency program
arises for some parameter values when we relax this assumption.
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3.A Proofs
Proof of Corollary 2 Assume that 퐹 (.) is weakly convex. The cross derivative with
respect to 푞 and 푅 can be rewritten as
∂2
∂푞∂푅
퐹
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
=
∂
∂푞
[
∂
∂푅
퐹
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)]
=
∂
∂푞
[
퐹 ′
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
⋅
∂
∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅)
]
=
∂
∂푞
퐹 ′
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
⋅
∂
∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅) + 퐹 ′
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
⋅
∂2
∂푞∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅)
Since 퐹 (.) is weakly convex, 퐹 ′(.) is weakly increasing which yields ∂
∂푞
퐹 ′
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
> 0
because 훿˜(푞,푅) is increasing in 푞. As we consider only policy instruments that help de-
terrence, 훿˜(푞,푅) is also increasing in 푅. Therefore, ∂
∂푞
퐹 ′
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
⋅ ∂
∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅) > 0. From
퐹 ′
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
> 0, we then can derive that a suﬃcient condition for ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
퐹
(
훿˜(푞,푅)
)
> 0
is ∂
2
∂푞∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6 We can rewrite the cross derivative of the critical discount
factor with respect to 푞 and 푅 as
∂2
∂푞∂푅
훿˜(푞,푅) =
∂
∂푞
[
∂
∂푅
푔(푞푅)
]
=
∂
∂푞
[푞푔′(푞푅)]
= 푞푅푔′′(푞푅) + 푔′(푞푅)
If 푥푔′(푥) is increasing, then its derivative 푥푔′′(푥) + 푔′(푥) is positive which implies that
∂훿2
훿푞훿푅
훿˜(푞,푅) > 0. From Proposition 5, we can conclude that 푞∗(푅) is increasing in 푅.
3.B Cost Function
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠) is the total expected discounted cost needed to guarantee a detection proba-
bility 푞 in each period 푡 = 0, 1, . . .. To see how this expression on 푅, denote the expected
mass of collusive industries at time 푡 when the ﬁrms face a constant probability of de-
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tection 푞 each period 푢푡 which is
푢푡 = (1− 푞)
푡ℎ(푞,푅)
where ℎ(푞,푅) = 1 − 퐹 (훿˜(푞,푅)). Hence, the expected mass of detected industries in
period 푡 is then
푣푡 = 푞푢푡 = 푞(1− 푞)
푡ℎ(푞,푅)
The mass of collusive industries which have been detected during 푡−1 periods and which
are under monitoring at the beginning of period 푡 ≥ 1 is
푤푡 =
푡−1∑
푘=0
푣푘
= 푞ℎ(푞,푅)
푡−1∑
푘=0
(1− 푞)푘
= 푞ℎ(푞,푅) ⋅
1− (1− 푞)푡
푞
= ℎ(푞,푅)
(
1− (1− 푞)푡
)
The mass of collusive industries not yet under monitoring at period 푡 ≥ 1 is then
푦푡 = 1− 푤푡 = 1− ℎ(푞,푅)
(
1− (1− 푞)푡
)
If we denote 푐 the constant unit cost of an investigation, the total expected discounted
cost needed to guarantee a detection probability 푞 in each period is
퐶(푞,푅, 훿푠) = 푐푞[1 + 훿푠푦1 + 훿
2
푠푦2 + 훿
3
푠푦3 + . . .]
= 푐푞
[(
∞∑
푘=0
훿푘푠
)
− ℎ(푞,푅)
(
∞∑
푘=1
훿푘푠
)
+ ℎ(푞,푅)
(
∞∑
푘=1
훿푘푠 (1− 푞)
푘
)]
= 푐푞
[
1
1− 훿푠
−
훿푠ℎ(푞,푅)
1− 훿푠
+
훿푠(1− 푞)ℎ(푞,푅)
1− 훿푠(1− 푞)
]
= 푐푞
[
1− 훿푠ℎ(푞,푅)
1− 훿푠
+
훿푠(1− 푞)ℎ(푞,푅)
1− 훿푠(1− 푞)
]
Conclusion
This thesis consists of three essays in Industrial Organization which provide answers to
the following questions:
1. What is the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of ﬁrms to
terminate and to report cartel activities to the antitrust authority?
2. Does the Amnesty Plus program encourage or rather discourage the formation of
cartels, and how should an eﬀective Amnesty Plus program be designed?
3. Should the antitrust authority decrease or rather increase its detection eﬀort following
the introduction or the modiﬁcation of a policy instrument that helps cartel deterrence?
To answer the ﬁrst question, I examine the treatment of parallel cartel involvements
in the US. Contrary to the European policy, the US Leniency Program contains Amnesty
Plus and Penalty Plus which provide ﬁnancial incentives to ﬁrms, already convicted in
one cartel, to report a second infringement. I show that these programs may have two
eﬀects: On the one hand, they can discourage leniency applications because the ﬁrms
anticipate that the reporting of a ﬁrst cartel results in the denunciation of a second,
potentially very proﬁtable, cartel. On the other hand, these programs can also encour-
age leniency applications and induce the ﬁrms to immediately report all their cartels.
Which one of the eﬀects prevails, depends on the speciﬁc parameters of the authority’s
enforcement policy.
To answer the second question, I set up an inﬁnitely repeated game of collusion
where the ﬁrms play multimarket trigger strategies and decide on cartel formation in
two markets. I show that Amnesty Plus, while clearly encouraging reporting after a ﬁrst
detection, has an ambiguous eﬀect at the stage of cartel formation. I suggest a simple
and feasible policy rule that avoids any negative eﬀects and makes a leniency program
with Amnesty Plus perform better than one without.
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To answer the third question, I change the focus of the analysis from leniency pro-
grams to more generic policy instruments. I determine the optimal detection eﬀort of
an antitrust authority to show how this optimal eﬀort changes with the introduction of
a policy instrument.
Altogether, this thesis contributes to the understanding of complex theoretical prob-
lems in competition policy with important practical implications for economic reality.
There however remains a lot to be done. Apart from interesting generalizations and
extensions of the theoretical framework, some empirical tests and experimental evidence
would be particularly insightful. I can therefore only hope that my work has succeeded
in awakening the interest of academic research on the topic.
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